Annotation. On the basis of archival materials, the article reconstructs the events of the Great Patriotic War in October 1941, when the 3rd Army of the Bryansk Front left the encirclement.

Summary ... On the basis of archival materials reconstructed the events of the Great Patriotic War in October 1941, when the 3rd Army Bryansk Front came out of the encirclement.

THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945

GAVRENKOV Alexander Alexandrovich- postgraduate student of the Bryansk State University named after academician I.G. Petrovsky

(Bryansk. E-mail: [email protected])

"SHOULD BE BREAKING SOON, IT'S FEELING IN EVERYTHING ..."

Fighting and exit from the encirclement of the 3rd Army of the Bryansk Front (October 1941)

The counteroffensive of Soviet troops during the battle of Moscow was preceded by heavy defensive battles, which the Red Army waged against Nazi troops on the distant approaches to the capital in October-November 1941. One of the most difficult, heroic, dramatic and at the same time little-studied operations of that period was the defensive actions and the exit from the encirclement in October 1941 of the 3rd Army of the Bryansk Front.

The 3rd Army (commanded by Lieutenant General V.I.Kuznetsov) was formed on September 1, 1939 as part of the Belarusian Special Military District (BOVO) on the basis of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces. The Great Patriotic War found the army on the state border west and southwest of Grodno. Battles of the initial period of the war on Grodno land, battles near Minsk and Bryansk, participation in battles near Moscow, Kursk, Operation Bagration, liberation of the Polish land, East Prussian operation, battle near Berlin and access to the Elbe, in total over 20 offensive and defensive operations - this is not a complete list of the stages of the glorious combat path of this association.

In the October days of 1941, the formations and units of the 3rd Soviet Army under the command of Major General Ya.G. Kreiser, who were on the defensive in the center of the Bryansk Front, found themselves in a ring of enemy troops. During this most difficult and intense defensive stage of the battle near Moscow, the troops of the Bryansk Front of the 1st formation (August 16 - November 10, 1941), repelling the German offensive, carried out the Oryol-Bryansk defensive operation (September 30 - October 23, 1941).

The general offensive of German troops on Moscow - Operation Typhoon - began on September 30 with a strike from the 2nd Panzer Group (from October 5, 1941, 2nd Panzer Army), Colonel General G. Guderian, from the Shostka area to Oryol. The enemy's 24th Motorized Corps quickly crushed the weak defenses of the 13th Army and broke into Oryol on October 3. On October 6, the enemy occupied Bryansk, encircling the troops of the 3rd and 13th Soviet armies. The 3rd Army found itself in the most difficult position. In the event that the Supreme Command of the Red Army made a decision, the front forces to defeat the enemy who had broken through and exit the encirclement of the army had to go about 300 km with battles through wooded and swampy terrain, in rainy autumn weather. On the withdrawal routes, Soviet troops were already waiting for parts of the enemy's 18th Panzer Division ...

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SVGK) ordered the command of the Bryansk Front to crush the screens of the German troops, break out of the operational encirclement, while maintaining its combat and organizational core to create a new defense front. Directive No. 1067 of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Colonel-General A.I. Eremenko1 on the withdrawal and conduct of hostilities with an inverted front to the commander of the 3rd Army, Major General Ya.G. Kreiser2 was presented on October 7, 1941. The directive was replicated and sent to the 13th and 50th armies3. This decision was taken at a time when the headquarters of the Bryansk Front had scant data about the enemy, about the 50th and 13th armies, the group of Major General A.N. Ermakova 4. All associations acted, in essence, scattered. The front headquarters, located in Belev, could not control them, because had no connection with any army and received only fragmentary information about them through the General Staff5. A serious violation of command and control by the front headquarters can also be judged by the fact that in the radiogram received from the Headquarters, the headquarters of the 3rd Army was notified that the duties of the commander of the Bryansk Front troops were entrusted to the commander of the 50th Army, Major General M.P. ... Petrov. In Moscow, obviously, it was believed that Colonel-General A.I. Eremenko is no longer alive 6. The commander of the Bryansk front from October 5 was in the area of ​​the station. Sven (11 km south-west of Bryansk), from where on the night of October 6 he presented to the Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov, the plan of actions for the withdrawal of front troops to the rear line in conditions of operational encirclement. B.M. Shaposhnikov was attentive to his report and promised to inform the Supreme Commander about it.

But the next day, October 6, at about 2.30 pm, the front headquarters operational group was attacked by an enemy tank group advancing on Bryansk from the south. Later it turned out that these were parts of the 17th Panzer Division of the Germans. Only by the morning of October 7 did the front commander arrive at Vzdruzhnoe, at the headquarters of the 3rd Army, where “he had the opportunity to personally and in writing give the order to turn the front and direct its implementation in the 3rd and 13th armies. The order was sent to the 50th army in cipher ”7.

The formations and units of the 3rd Army took up defensive positions in the center of the Bryansk Front. On the first day of the German offensive in this sector of the front, the enemy did not undertake active hostilities, but fought pinning battles. Only on October 1, fierce battles unfolded, and units of the German army with an attack on Pochep managed to occupy an important tactically point in the defense of the 280th Infantry Division (Divisional Commander Major General S.E. Danilov). Several times divisions of the division launched a counterattack and returned the positions captured by the Germans.

If in the central sector of the front the activity of the Germans did not arouse concern among the command of the front and the 3rd Army, then on the flanks, in the places of the front breakthrough in sectors defended by the formations of the 13th and 50th armies, the situation was threatening, and sometimes catastrophic.

On October 7, 1941, the main command of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht reported to the General Staff that “near Bryansk, the encirclement of the 3rd Army was almost complete. In front of the flanks of the army group, the enemy begins to withdraw. The pulling up of large forces to the front or flanks of Army Group 7.10 was not established ”9. The conclusions made by the German command were true. The front command and the Supreme Command Headquarters did not have reserves for countering the enemy tank and motorized formations that had broken through to the rear of our troops, strikes against their rear and flanks. The high command found it difficult to find separate units and formations in order to at least temporarily detain the enemy, who was developing an offensive on Tula and further on Moscow. In these conditions, high hopes were pinned on the surrounded front troops, including the 3rd Army: with active defense, with a decisive blow to the rear of the 2nd German tank group, they had to pin down and immobilize its tank formations, defeat the opposing enemy, and leave with a fight from the encirclement and restore the front line. The plan for the withdrawal of front troops to the rear line in conditions of operational encirclement was determined by the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 002737.

The withdrawal of front troops, including the 3rd Army, was developed at the headquarters of the 3rd Army with the personal participation of Colonel-General A.I. Eremenko. It was necessary to carry out a turn of the front by 180 degrees and, retreating to the Ponyri - Fatezh line, by a blow to the rear of the German troops to destroy the Oryol grouping of the enemy. On the night of October 8, the main forces of the army began to carry out the assigned tasks, covered by strong rear guards, broke away from the enemy and by the morning made a long, at the limit of the endurance of personnel, a march of 60 km.

On the Uta line (on the Desna River, 32 km north of Trubchevsk), the enemy, who took up defensive positions on the prepared rear line of the front, put up especially strong resistance. The Germans blocked all exits from the forests along the line of Navlya, Borshchevo, Pogreby, Lokot and met the retreating army units with organized fire. It was not possible to break the enemy's resistance outright. Stubborn battles on this line continued from 8 to 11 October10. However, the scattered attacks of the suitable parts did not bring success.<…>

Read the full version of the article in the paper version of the "Military Historical Journal" and on the website of the Scientific Electronic Libraryhttp: www. elibrary. ru

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NOTES

1 Eremenko Andrey Ivanovich(1892-1970) - Marshal of the Soviet Union (1955), Hero of the Soviet Union (1944), Hero of Czechoslovakia (1970). At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War from June 30 to July 2, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko commanded the troops of the Western Front. He supervised the hostilities in the Smolensk battle. From August 14 - Commander of the Bryansk Front. In October-December A.I. Eremenko was being treated in a hospital after being wounded. Since December 1941, Colonel-General A.I. Eremenko commanded the 4th Shock Army. From February to August 1942 he was in the hospital. From August 1942 he commanded the troops of the South-Eastern fronts, from September - the Stalingrad fronts. From January 1943 he commanded the troops of the Southern Front, from April 1943 - the troops of the Kalinin Front. In February-April 1944 he commanded a separate Primorsky army. Since March 1945 - Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

2 Kreizer Yakov Grigorievich(1905-1969) - General of the Army (1962), Hero of the Soviet Union (1941). In the army since 1921. Since 1939 - commander of a rifle division. June 1941 - Colonel. During the war - commander of the 1st Moscow motorized rifle division on the Western Front, commander of the 3rd army (August-December 1941). From February 1942 - Deputy Commander of the 57th Army, Commander of the 1st Reserve, Deputy Commander and Commander of the 2nd Guards Armies of the Southern Front. From August 1943 until the end of the war, Ya.G. Kreiser is the commander of the 51st Army.

3 Central archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF). F. 48. Op. 3412.D. 8.L. 335-337.

4 Ermakov Arkady Nikolaevich(1899-1957) - Lieutenant General (1944). Member of the Civil War. In July 1941 - Major General. October-November - Commander of the 50th Army, Deputy Commander of the Bryansk Front. In March-September 1943 - commander of the 20th Army of the Western Front.

5 TsAMO RF. F. 16.Op. 1071.D.1V. L. 152-158.

6 Ibid. F. 48. Op. 1554.D. 91.L. 350.

7 Ibid. F. 202. Op. 5.D. 38.L. 1-30.

8 Ibid. F. 16.Op. 1071.D. 3545.L. 469-480.

9 Ibid. F. 500. Op. 12462.D. 548.L. 193-198.

10 Ibid. F. 16.Op. 1071.D. 3545.L. 202-209.

The battles on the Bolkhov area in the winter-spring of 1942 have been little studied. As a rule, battles are characterized as "senseless carnage" and the like. expressions. They are based on the fact that the objectives of the operation were not achieved, and the losses of the Crane Army were large, and the enemy "did not notice" these battles.

Considering that most of the ski battalions of the Bryansk Front fought in the 3rd army, I will try to consider these battles in a little more detail. This article is not a consideration of the Bolkhov-Mtsensk offensive operation from January 8 to April 20, 1942 as a whole, but only the battles of the 3rd army from February to April. We can assume that this is the chronology of events in the zone of the 3rd army from February to April 1942. Professional historians may disagree.

I'll start a little from afar. Why were these battles forgotten? The answer is simple - the declared goals were not achieved - the enemy's Oryol grouping could not be destroyed, Oryol and Bryansk could not be taken. The losses were great. Therefore, the commanders who fought on the Bryansk front had a failure in their memoirs. So the commander of the 3rd army P.I. Batov in his memoirs limited himself to one phrase, that he was the commander of the 3rd army for a month.

Historians have also bypassed these battles. There were no high-profile victories or high-profile defeats. Probably those who like to throw mud at everything, did not bypass these battles. Unfortunately, objective research is possible, but I have not yet met them.

So 3 army

In December, the 3rd army, together with units of the Southwestern Front, conducted an excellent Yelets offensive operation. Then it advanced in the Bolkhov area. With the onset, since December, no new connections have been received. In December, on the contrary, the cavalry divisions were taken from her, and only at the end of January the army received 287 SD. According to Cherevichenko's report, both armies 3 and 13, together on 200 km of the front as of 8.1.42, had: 4500 bayonets,
117 heavy machine guns, 149 light machine guns, 47 mortars, 82 divisional artillery guns, and 19 regimental guns and 45 mm - 19. In fact, this is not a front, but a reinforced division - what the Germans in their memoirs defined as the absolute superiority of Russians in numbers.
The combat composition of the divisions of both the 3rd and 13th armies was 400-800 people.

In early January 1942, the 3rd army began fighting on the border of the Zusha and Oka rivers.

What was the Bryansk front, which included the 3rd army, Kazakov described well in his memoirs of the chief of staff of the Bryansk front.

« The Bryansk Front then consisted of three armies: 61st, 3rd and 13th, in which there were up to twenty rifle divisions. The operational formation of our troops was here in one echelon with small army reserves. The front reserve was represented by two cavalry corps, each consisting of three divisions. There was no infantry in the front-line reserve at all.
The most numerous was the 61st Army, commanded by Lieutenant General M.M. Popov. It operated on a terrain of average ruggedness, without natural obstacles, occupying up to 70 kilometers along the front.
The troops of the 3rd Army were located at the border of the Oka and Zusha rivers, with a front of up to 120 kilometers. This army was commanded by Lieutenant General P.I.Batov.
The 13th Army under the command of Major General N.P. Pukhov fought on the Novosil, Vyshe-Dolgoye front with a total length of 110 kilometers.
The neighboring 40th Army of the Southwestern Front, which later also retreated to us, had a front of a little more than 100 kilometers, stretching over completely open terrain, without any natural barriers. It was commanded by Lieutenant General M.A.Parsegov.
When studying the situation, I could not help but pay attention to the fact that in our front headquarters and in the headquarters of the armies, no one seriously showed concern for the creation of second echelons, and the troops of the first echelon did not have real defensive structures.
I would also like to say about one more "illness" that some generals and officers of the front and armies were suffering from at that time - this is a passion for private operations with limited goals.

Nevertheless, I was completely taken over by private operations from the very first days of my inauguration. All of them took time to prepare. All were associated with losses in personnel and large expenditures of material resources. It is indicative that the main stream of replenishment was sent to the 3rd Army, where such operations were carried out more often than others. In January, for example, eight ski battalions were sent to the troops of this army - out of fourteen we received, and six marching companies - out of ten that arrived at the Bryansk front.»

What was the enemy

« In the zone of the Bryansk Front, the enemy had a fairly large grouping. It consisted of more than twenty divisions, including three armored and three motorized. In October - November 1941, a significant part of these troops under the command of Guderian unsuccessfully tried to capture Tula. Now they were located in the area of ​​Orel and Mtsensk. To the south were units of the 2nd German army.
The enemy has not yet managed to create a solid defense. He used villages and towns with stone buildings as strongholds. The abundance and quality of such buildings created certain advantages for the defending German units.»
Summarizing the position of the troops before the start of the February battles, one can see the approximate equality of forces, twenty rifle divisions against 20 enemy divisions that were on the defensive. At the same time, the enemy had 3 tank - 4.17.18 TD, of which two 17 and 4 TD were near Bolkhov. and two motorized divisions, 25th and 29th MD, and the SS motorized regiment "Great Germany", all formations near Bolkhov. The presence of tank and motorized divisions meant that the enemy could quickly transfer mobile units to the breakthrough area and counterattack. The tank and motorized divisions of the enemy also had strong artillery with a caliber of up to 210 mm inclusive. If part of the enemy's divisions was weakened in previous battles, but our units for the most part passed through the encirclements of the summer-autumn of 1941 and conducted offensives in December and January and were few in number, as mentioned earlier.
The statement that the enemy did not create a solid defense is also not entirely clear. The Germans stated that along the Tim - Belev line (along the TIM-ZUSHA-OKA rivers and the cut-off position on the Vyrka River) they had a prepared fortified winter position. So 3 armies had to storm rather well-prepared enemy positions, which he had been preparing from the beginning of December 1941. The 61st army advanced partially bypassing the fortified line.
The receipt of 14 ski battalions in January is rather doubtful, so far only two 100 and 101 ski battalions are known that are listed in the front, but this possibility cannot be completely ruled out.
The story about "private" transactions is not consistent. First, the command of the Bryansk Front practically withdrew from the command of the front, shifting all its attention to the direction of the 3rd army. Secondly, the direction of the 3rd army was not very convenient for the offensive - to force Zusha and Oka and break through the heavily fortified enemy defenses. For a private operation, it would be more logical to surround and take Mtsensk, and then move directly to Oryol. But if we take into account that the attacks of the 3rd army were supposed to lead to the defeat of the enemy's Bolkhov grouping, only in cooperation with the 61st armies of the Western Front, then everything becomes clear. In the third, the operation lasted for almost three months and practically coincided in terms with the general winter offensive. Fourth, the Stavka could hardly ignore the large enemy grouping on the flank of the Western Front. The enemy, taking advantage of the passivity of our troops, could easily organize a counterattack into the flank and rear of the strike group of the Western Front. The events near Sukhinichi confirm this. The German counterattack did not receive development, not only because the 16th and 10th armies stubbornly resisted, but also because the 3rd and 61st armies fought offensive battles in the Mtsensk-Balkhov directions. The events of August 1942 once again confirmed that the Oryol ledge is extremely dangerous. So, most likely, the operation of the 3rd army was carried out with the sanction and by order of the Headquarters. The frequent change of commanders also indicates that they were simply ripped off the evil for failure. And in early April, organizational withdrawals followed on the commander of the Bryansk front, he was removed from office with a demotion, not because of the failure of a private army operation. The link that the operation was private was most likely due to the failure of the operation.
It should be noted one more feature that negatively affected the results of the battles near Bolkhov. Army 3 was part of the Bryansk Front, and 61 Army was part of the Bryansk, then the Western, then again the Bryansk fronts. Considering that the Bryansk Front was subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction (for which the Bolkhov direction was a bearish angle), and the Western Front to the commander-in-chief of the Western direction, it was extremely difficult to organize interaction between the two armies. Moreover, in three months three commanders were replaced in the army. Lieutenant General Pshennikov PS - was blown up by a mine. Lieutenant General Batov PI - removed from office and replaced by Major General Zhmachenko F. F, who was also soon replaced. Both later commanded the armies well, but the change of command during the offensive was not conducive to the success of the operations. Later, the Headquarters corrected the situation by including the 61,3,13,40 army in the Bryansk Front and subordinating the front directly to the Headquarters, but this happened already in April, time was lost, the units suffered losses and the new offensive did not bring success.
The terrain in front of the 3rd army was also unfavorable for the attackers - the Zusha and Oka rivers had high and steep banks and were incredibly winding, which created a certain benefit for the enemy.
Who opposed the 3rd and 61st armies.

German operational map of section 2 TA in the Mtsensk - Bolkhov-Sukhinichi area on February 10, 1942

Area of ​​operations of the 3rd army
And what was the enemy like? There was no trace of any weak units experiencing supply difficulties.
2 tank army, consisted of 35 and 53 army and 47, 24 motorized corps, which defended on a fairly wide front from Mtsensk to Sukhinichi and Kirov.
The 35th Army Corps defended itself in the Mtsensk area 262, 293 PD and 29 MD.

Next to it was the 53rd Army Corps in the ledge near Bolkhov 25 MD, 112, 167, 296, 56 PD.
The breakthrough of the 61st Army was held back by the 47th Panzer Corps consisting of the 4th and 17th TD, the SS "Great Germany" regiment, 134th TD.
In the Sukhinichi-Kirov area, the 24th Panzer Corps united units 208,211,216,339 PD and 18 TD.
There were also other units, such as combat groups that are difficult to account for and which were formed from various parts of the rear, the Luftwaffe, the TODT organization, the Imperial Labor Service and other organizations that were not part of the Wehrmacht.
So the largest enemy grouping was in the Bolkhov area in front of the 3rd and 61st armies - 3 out of 4 corps, 5 out of 6 mobile formations. Directly in front of the 3rd army, there were 3 mobile units - 25, 29 MD and 17 TD.
210 mm gun in position

As well as parts of the reinforcement of the RGK artillery - for example, the 604 division with 210 mm guns 21 cm Mrs 18, actively participated in battles in the region of Mtsensk and the surrounding area, supporting 29 MD and 167 AP. Or 69 artillery regiment RGKs with 100 mm guns 10 cm sK 18, supported 53 AK from March 1942.
There was also a 521 PTB armed with a Panzerjäger I - despite the 47 mm gun, it was equipped with subcaliber shells and could fight the T-34 and KV from a distance of 500-600 meters.
Not all parts of the Germans were battered, for example, the 56th PD arrived at the front only in December 1941. The enemy also noted the good completeness of 134 AP and 4 TD.
The enemy's defense along the Oka River was also strong - three lines of defense, three lines of trenches in each, connected by communication trenches. The defense lines are covered with minefields and barbed wire. The bunkers and dugouts were equipped for life in the winter - there were stoves, bunks and so on. Bunkers had from 4 to 12 rolls. Each strong point numbered at least 12-15 firing points - machine guns, mortars and anti-tank artillery, the entire defense was supported by heavy artillery fire. The presence of tank units allowed the enemy to quickly transfer them to the threatened direction and deliver counterstrikes.
The presence in the rear of large junctions of the roads of Bryansk and Orel and the paved highway Oryol - Mtsensk made it possible for the enemy to easily replenish his units and supply them with everything necessary for the battle.

3 army, which had not withdrawn from the battles for several months, and did not receive sufficient reinforcement, it was necessary to hack this defense.

Army 3 was formed on September 1, 1939 as part of the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces.
In September-October 1939, the 3rd army took part in the Polish campaign of the Red Army.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the army (4th rifle and 11th mechanized corps, 68th fortified area, 7th artillery brigade of anti-tank defense, a number of artillery and other units) as part of the Western Front fought heavy defensive battles in the regions of Grodno, Lida , Novogrudok. At the end of June 1941, numerically superior enemy forces managed to break through to the Minsk region and cut off its troops from other forces of the front. Until the beginning of July, formations and units of the army fought heroically behind enemy lines, holding down significant forces. Subsequently, most of the army's troops fought out of the encirclement, some of its units remained in the rear of the enemy, where they conducted partisan actions. On the night of July 1, 1941, the remnants of the army management, headed by the commander, Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov managed to break through to the area east of Minsk, but only on July 28, 1941, they managed to break out of the encirclement north of Rogachev, together with a detachment of the 204 motorized division and the 274 rifle regiment of the 24 Samara-Ulyanovsk Iron Division. In the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the USSR No. 270 of August 16, 1941, "On the responsibility of servicemen for surrendering and leaving weapons to the enemy," it was said that the commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov and a member of the Military Council, Army Commissar of the 2nd rank, Biryukov, were fought out of the encirclement 498 armed Red Army men and commanders of units of the 3rd army and organized the exit from the encirclement of 108 and 64 rifle divisions ...

After leaving the encirclement, the 3rd army from July 5, 1941 was at the disposal of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was replenished and on August 1, 1941 was included in the Central Front. V.I. Kuznetsov was left in command of the army, Major General A.S. Zhidova; the headquarters was located in the area west of Kalinkovichi. The army handed over to the subordination of the 66th rifle corps, the Mozyr fortified area, as well as the 75th rifle division.

In the second half of August 1941, the Central Front was defeated and disbanded. The 3rd army was forced to leave Mozyr, after a march of many kilometers, it transferred its troops to 21 armies, and its headquarters was moved to the junction of the 50 and 13 armies with subordination to the headquarters of the Bryansk front. Major General Ya.G. Kreiser was appointed commander of the army. Former army commander Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov was appointed commander of the 21st army, and after its defeat in the Kiev cauldron he led the 58th army.

The 3rd army took part in the Smolensk battle, the Orel-Bryansk defensive operation.

In November 1941, its formations and units as part of the Southwestern Front (from November 11) continued to conduct defensive battles and by December 5 withdrew to the line southeast of Bogoroditsk, east of Efremov. With the transition of the Red Army troops to the counteroffensive near Moscow, the 3rd Army took part in the Yelets operation and the liberation of the city of Efremov (December 13, 1941). Continuing to develop the offensive as part of the Bryansk Front of the 2nd formation (from December 24), by the end of December it reached the right bank of the river. Zusha east of Oryol, where it went on the defensive.

Subsequently, defending the occupied line, until the summer of 1943, it periodically undertook offensive actions with limited goals and improved its position in a number of sectors. On March 13, 1943, the army was included in the Central Front of the 2nd formation, on March 27 - in the Oryol Front (from March 28, the Bryansk Front of the 3rd formation).

In June 1943, Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov, who commanded her until the end of the war.

In July-August 1943, the army participated in the Oryol strategic offensive operation, in September - early October - in the Bryansk offensive operation, at the end of which it reached the left bank of the river. Sozh near the town of Propoisk (Slavgorod). On October 8, it was transferred to the Central (from October 20, Belorussian, from February 24, 1944, the 1st Belorussian) front and, in their composition, fought in Gomel-Rechitskaya (November 1943) and in Rogachevsko-Zhlobinskaya (February 1944. ) offensive operations.

On April 6, the army was included in the Byelorussian Front of the 2nd Formation, on April 17 of the 1st Belorussian Front of the 2nd Formation, on July 5 of the 2nd Belorussian Front of the 2nd Formation.

In the second half of 1944, army troops took part in the liberation of Belarus and the eastern regions of Poland, in the Bobruisk, Minsk and Bialystok offensive operations. We fought over 500 km and liberated the cities of Novogrudok (July 8), Volkovysk (July 14), Bialystok (July 27), Ostrolenka (September 6) and Lomzha (September 13). Narev and took up defense on the Ostrolenka-Ruzhany line.

In January 1945, during the Mlavsko-Elbing operation, the army advanced as part of the front shock group from the Ruzhany bridgehead in the direction of Willenberg (Velbark), Melzak (Penenzhno).

On February 10, she entered the 3rd Belorussian Front, as part of which in March she took part in the liquidation of the East Prussian enemy grouping southwest of Konigsberg (Kaliningrad).

In early April, the 3rd Army was withdrawn to the front reserve, redeployed to the area southeast of Kustrin, on April 16 it was included in the 1st Belorussian Front of the 2nd formation and participated in the Berlin operation as part of it.

In August 1945, the army was disbanded, its headquarters was sent to form the headquarters of the Minsk military district.

Commanders: Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov (June 1939 - August 1941); Major General Kreizer J.G. (August-December 1941); Lieutenant General Pshennikov P.S. (December 1941); Lieutenant General Batov P.I. (December 1941 - February 1942); Major General Zhmachenko F.F. (February-May 1942); Lieutenant General P.P. Korzun (May 1942 - June 1943); Lieutenant General, since June 1944 Colonel General A.V. Gorbatov (June 1943 - until the end of the war).

Members of the Military Council: Army Commissar 2nd Rank N.I. Biryukov (April-August 1941); Divisional Commissioner F.I. Shlykov (August 1941 - April 1942); Brigadier Commissar, from December 1942 Major General, from November 1944 Lieutenant General I.P. Konov (April 1942 - until the end of the war).

Chiefs of Staff: Major General A.K. Kondratyev (September 1939 - July 1941); Major General Zhadov A.S. (August 1941 - May 1942); Major General, since September 1944 Lieutenant General M.V. Ivashechkin (May 1942 - until the end of the war).

Subordination:
Belarusian Special Military District
Western front
Central front
Bryansk front
Southwestern Front
Oryol front
Belarusian front
1st Belorussian Front
2nd Belorussian Front
3rd Belorussian Front

3rd army

& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp Formed in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces. In September 1939 she took part in the liberation campaign of the Soviet Army in Western Belarus. Since the beginning of the war, the army (4th Rifle Corps, 11th Mechanized Corps, 68th UR, a number of artillery and other formations and units) as part of the Western Front fought defensive battles in the regions of Grodno, Lida, Novogrudok (from the end of June - in environment). After leaving the encirclement, it was in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, it was re-equipped and at the beginning of August transferred to the Central, from August 25 to the Bryansk front, as part of which it participated in the Smolensk battle and the Moscow battle (from November 11 as part of the South-Western, from December 24 - the Bryansk front ). Until the summer of 1943, it held defenses east of Orel. In July 1943 - February 1944, as part of the Bryansk, from October 7 - the Central (from October 20, Belorussian, from February 17, 1944, 1st Belorussian) fronts, she participated in the Orel, Bryansk, Gomel - Rechitsa and Rogachev - Zhlobin offensive operations. In the summer of 1944, she took part in the Belorussian (from July 5 in the 2nd Belorussian Front), in January - March 1945 in the East Prussian (from February 10 in the 3rd Belorussian Front) offensive operations. In early April 1945 she was included in the 1st Belorussian Front and took part in the Berlin offensive operation.

& nbsp Commanders:
Kuznetsov V.I. (June - August 1941), Lieutenant General
Kreizer J.G. (August - December 13, 1941), Major General
Pshennikov P.S. (14 - 28 December 1941), Lieutenant General
Batov P.I. (December 29, 1941 - February 11, 1942), Lieutenant General
Zhmachenko F.F. (February 12 - May 1942), Major General
Korzun P.P. (May 1942 - June 1943), Lieutenant General
Gorbatov F.V. (June 1943 - May 1945), lieutenant general, since the end of June 1944 colonel general
Composition on 01.01.1943:
,,,,,, 79 tbr, 420 aap, 584, 1242 iptap, 139 min. (1 minbr), 474, 475 min., 6 guards. mp, 1283 zenap, 31, 55 one bepo, 53 pnb, 348 oib (?).
& nbsp Literature:
A. V. Gorbatov 3rd Army in the battles for the liberation of Belarus, in the book "Liberation of Belarus. 1944" // - 2nd edition, Moscow, 1974.
A. V. Gorbatov Years and wars.// - Moscow, Military Publishing, 1965, 384 p.
& nbsp & nbsp The book of the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army A.V. Gorbatov, about his life and military service, about the path he traveled from a soldier of the tsarist army to commander-3 during the Great Patriotic War. The main focus is on showing the battles near Smolensk, Kharkov, Stalingrad, Orel, Chernigov, Gomel, in Belarus, East Prussia and near Berlin
Beilin P.E. Live, soldier.// - Moscow, Military Publishing, 1960, 131 p.
& nbsp & nbsp During the Great Patriotic War, the author was a surgeon. A book about the exploits of the doctors of the mobile field hospital of the 3rd Army, which took part in the battles near Mtsensk, in the liberation of Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, in the final battles in the Berlin direction.

& nbsp & nbsp & nbsp & nbsp | & nbsp & nbsp