Defense of Sevastopol - a large-scale defensive operation of Soviet troops in the vicinity of Sevastopol in the first period of the Great Patriotic War.

Background and position of the parties

Ukraine in the first period of the war was one of the main strategically important points for the German command, since the capture of Ukraine would allow Hitler to open routes to Moscow from the southern borders, as well as provide his army with food and heat for conducting military operations in the winter. In addition, Crimea was a particularly important part of Ukraine, as it opened the way for the Nazis to the Caucasus, where there were large oil reserves. Aviation was also based in Crimea, and the capture of the peninsula would simultaneously close the way for Soviet aviation and open up new opportunities for German aviation.

By the end of September 1941, German troops managed to conquer Smolensk, Kyiv, and also blockade Leningrad. In the South-Western direction, Hitler also achieved significant success - he managed to subjugate almost half of Ukraine and smash the defenses of the Soviet troops. Inspired by their success, the Germans moved towards Crimea, and Soviet troops began preparing the defense of the peninsula, and Sevastopol in particular.

At the time of the start of the clash, the forces of the opponents were approximately equal.

Progress of the defense of Sevastopol

The defense of Sevastopol lasted almost a year and had several main stages:

• First German offensive;
• Second German offensive;
• Calm period in January-May 1942;
• Third German offensive.

On October 25, 1941, German troops broke through the defense line of the Soviet army and moved towards Crimea with the goal of occupying the peninsula as soon as possible. At the same time, the Soviet command began a retreat towards Kerch, from where part of the army later crossed to Kuban. The remainder of the Soviet troops began to retreat towards Sevastopol to defend the city. The Germans pursued both parts of the Soviet army, and also sent another detachment directly to Sevastopol, bypassing the Russian army, to surround the city and capture it.

By November 1941, there were about 20 thousand Soviet troops in Sevastopol, and on November 5, the first clashes began between the Germans and the Soviet army on the distant approaches to the city.

The first German offensive on Sevastopol

On November 11, several German divisions attacked Soviet troops on the approaches to the city, but met serious resistance - fierce fighting continued until the 21st. During the battles, the Germans managed to advance several kilometers inland in two directions at once, and the front line was established 12 kilometers from Sevastopol.

After this, both armies began to strengthen their composition, reinforcements arrived to the Soviet troops, and the Germans focused their attention on other territories of Crimea. As a result, by November 16, the peninsula, except for Sevastopol, was captured by German troops. Hitler decided to “finish off” Sevastopol and all free armies moved towards the city.

Second German offensive on Sevastopol

A new attack was planned for November 27, but due to a number of problems it took place only on December 17, 1941. The Germans attacked the Soviet front and fierce fighting began again, as a result of which the German army was again able to gain the advantage and advance towards the city.

On December 19, the Soviet command reported that there was no longer any strength left for defense and the city would not hold out even until the 20th, but contrary to forecasts, the army was able to resist until November 21, when help arrived.

In two weeks of fighting, the Germans were able to move the front line by an average of 10 kilometers, which meant that they practically came close to the city.

January-May 1942

It was a relatively calm period, only small, local battles took place, as German troops went to the east of the Crimean Peninsula, and the Soviet army at that time replenished its troops with new divisions.

Third German offensive on Sevastopol

On May 18, Soviet resistance in eastern Crimea was finally destroyed, and the German army again concentrated on Sevastopol. It was necessary to capture the city in the near future - for this, artillery was brought to the border.

On June 2, the assault on Sevastopol began simultaneously from the ground and air, part of the German army distracted the enemy in the east, and part participated directly in the assault.

By June 17, the north of Sevastopol, as well as part of the south, was captured. By June 29, the Germans entered the city, and the fighting continued there.

On July 1, 1942, Sevastopol was completely captured by the Germans, and the remnants of the Soviet army went to Chersonesos, expecting to be evacuated from there. The fighting continued in Chersonesos for several more days, no one evacuated the army, and the soldiers were soon captured or killed.

Results of the defense of Sevastopol

The defense of Sevastopol went down in history as an example of the courage of Soviet soldiers, as well as one of the most difficult and lengthy operations of the first period of the war. Despite the resistance, the city was taken, which meant that the entire Crimea came under the jurisdiction of Germany. Hitler received a very advantageous position, and the Soviet command was forced to admit that they had actually lost Ukraine.

When Plan Barbarossa began in mid-1941, an attack on the Crimean Peninsula was not even planned. The implication was that when major Soviet political centers like Moscow came under German control, the entire Soviet Union itself would fall to pieces.

But these hopes were quickly dashed in July 1941, when two Soviet air attacks on Axis-held oil fields in Romania, launched from Sevastopol, destroyed 11,000 tons of oil.

Composition of the Wehrmacht Attack Forces

On July 23, 1941, Adolf Hitler issued Directive 33, which prioritized the conquest of Crimea. On August 21, Hitler declared that "the capture of the Crimean Peninsula is of enormous importance for the protection of oil supplies from Romania."

The attack on Sevastopol was entrusted to the Eleventh Army under the command of Colonel General. In October 1941, the army was relieved of other Barbarossa missions and was now focused on attacking the Crimea.

Lacking sufficient tanks, Manstein could not carry out the mobile action with which he had succeeded in France. Instead, he relied on his infantry. There were also Romanian troops under his command. Some of the Romanians, especially the Mountain Brigade troops, were known to be elite fighters, but in general the Romanians were poorly equipped and thus never deployed independently without direct German support.

Beginning of the invasion of Crimea

On October 18, General Erik Hansen, commander of the German 54th Corps, together with the 22nd, 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions, began an attack on the Soviet 51st Army in Ishuni. Although the Soviet army had greater numbers and air superiority, Hansen's army advanced slowly, capturing Yishun on October 28 after the arrival of three groups of BF109s overpowered the Soviet air force. USSR troops retreated to Sevastopol, marking the beginning of the siege.

The beginning of the siege of Sevastopol

Even before the remnants of the Soviet 51st Army began to retreat to Sevastopol, Vice Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky had already trained thousands of people to build defensive structures.

He also formed several naval infantry units from the ship's sailors; the sailors were not trained in land combat, but they helped boost the numbers that Oktyabrsky desperately needed on the front lines. On October 30, the Navy's Black Sea Fleet brought in the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade from Novorossiysk to further ease the situation.

On October 30, 1941, advanced units of the German 132nd Infantry Division were discovered. The Soviet army opened fire with 305 mm coastal defense guns at the suspected German position; The location of these guns, coastal battery 30, would soon be called “Fort Maxim Gorky I”.

Meanwhile, the Soviet naval infantry withstood the first attack on Sevastopol. On November 9, 19,894 soldiers, ten T-26 tanks, 152 guns and 20 mortars arrived from the sea, and Oktyabrsky already had 52,000 soldiers at his disposal.

On November 10, Manstein finally decided that he was sufficiently prepared to launch a full-fledged offensive. The German 50th Infantry Division, under the command of General Friedrich Schmidt, attacked first, capturing the village of Uppa near the Chernaya River southeast of Sevastopol.

The next day, the 132nd Infantry Division, under the command of Lieutenant General Fritz Lindemann, captured the village of Mekenzia in the northeast. By November 15, the attack was stopped by a furious response from Soviet soldiers and sailors supported by naval artillery from the Paris Commune. Manstein refused to advance on November 21, losing 2,000 soldiers, although the losses of the Soviet army were much greater.

In December 1941, Oktyabrsky received naval reinforcements in the form of the new 388th Rifle Division, and Soviet engineers took advantage of the brief respite to lay extensive minefields while Manstein's men regrouped for another attack.

The next German attack began on December 17, with artillery bombardment beginning at six in the morning. 34 Ju-87 Stukas and 20 bombers prepared for the attack, which began with the advance of the 22nd Infantry Division into territory held by the Soviet 8th Naval Brigade north of the Belbek River.

Soon the German 50th and 132nd rifle divisions also began an attack on the central line of defense. On December 22, the 8th Naval Brigade retreated to the city, and on December 23, the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade captured a strategic point southeast of the city.

Meanwhile, Axis forces also headed towards Kerch on the eastern side of the peninsula. Soviet Lieutenant General Vladimir Lvov made a daring amphibious landing with 5,000 soldiers of the 51st Army on December 26, followed by a larger landing with 23,000 soldiers of the 44th Army with a tank battalion at Feodosia on December 29. This move forced Germany to postpone the next attack on Sevastopol in order to cope with the new threat.

Previously, Hitler demanded that Sevastopol be captured by the end of the year in order to boost morale that had fallen after the unsuccessful invasion of Russia, but this demand was not fulfilled. At that time, the losses of the German army were much higher than expected - only from December 17 to 31 they lost 8,595 soldiers. The Soviet army, as in almost every battle of World War II, suffered much greater losses of personnel - 7,000 dead and 20,000 prisoners.

On January 15, 1942, Manstein launched a hasty counterattack, capturing Feodosia, however, this offensive was launched before his troops were ready, due to which they failed to destroy the 44th and 51st armies, but this attack prevented the Soviet army to keep the initiative. Soviet soldiers knew that seizing the initiative was vital and launched a series of attacks from February to April 1942. All attacks failed in attempts to break through the defense line of the German army, which continued to besiege Sevastopol on land.

Progress of the defense of Sevastopol

After a long period of preparation, Manstein decided that the time had come for a new large-scale offensive. On May 8, 1942, he launched Operation Bustard Hunt, which required General Maximillian's corps to attack the Soviet 44th Army on the south coast.

The operation began at four in the morning with a ten-minute artillery bombardment, and by half past seven the leading Soviet troops were routed under pressure from German attacks from the front and the landing of the 902nd Assault Group and the 436th Infantry Regiment in the rear. Afterwards, numerous German and Romanian forces moved towards Kerch.

On May 9, an important airport in Marfovka, thirty kilometers from which the offensive began, had already been captured by German troops, who destroyed 35 I-153 fighters located there. Lieutenant General Dmitry Kozlov panicked, which allowed Manstein to advance further with the 22nd Panzer Division, which quickly destroyed the remnants of the 51st Army.

On May 14, German troops entered Kerch from the eastern side of the peninsula, and on May 20 they finally captured the city. Due to the panic and inaction of Kozlov and his men, only 37,000 soldiers were evacuated from Kerch, while 28,000 were killed and 147,000 captured. Manstein's victory effectively destroyed three Soviet armies with only 3,397 casualties.

After Operation Bustard Hunt, the 22nd Tank Division was moved north from Crimea to prepare for the operation in Kharkov.

With pressure eased in the east, the Germans again concentrated on Sevastopol, launching Operation Sturgeon. At five forty in the morning on June 2, 1942, a major bombardment of defensive positions near Sevastopol began. At six in the morning the Luftwaffe joined the attack and dropped 570 tons of bombs.

On the night of June 6, the Soviet army, which had previously fired artillery against attacks by German batteries, opened fire on German positions. Oktyabrsky knew that this bombardment had to come from the north, otherwise it would not have lasted so long. As Oktyabrsky suspected, the Germans were moving. The soldiers of the 132nd Infantry Division moved towards the Belbek River, and the 22nd Infantry Division also changed its location. Progress was slow, but the Germans advanced through heavy Soviet mortar fire and air strikes. In the afternoon, around seven in the evening, the first and only counterattack of the battalion of the Soviet 747th Infantry Regiment began; The Germans lost 2,357 people, including 340 killed.

Also, on June 7, Fretter-Picot, whose corps occupied the southern defensive line of the Soviet army, decided that he would not sit back while the generals in the north earned glory in a large-scale offensive, and began to probe the Soviet defenses. He achieved minor successes, but his attack resulted in a disproportionate number of casualties, and Manstein forbade him to attack in a similar manner.

On June 8, the Soviet army launched a counterattack, but despite tank support, coordination between infantry, artillery and tanks was poor and the attack failed. At ten in the morning the Germans attacked, and, having suffered losses of 1,700 soldiers, advanced three kilometers closer to Sevastopol. On June 9, the German 132nd Rifle Division attacked coastal battery 30 "Fort Maxim Gorky", but was pushed back twice, at ten in the morning and noon, by the Soviet 95th Rifle Division. Several other Soviet counterattacks also occurred on June 9, but they did not make a significant contribution to the battle.

On June 11, Major General Ivan Petrov launched a large-scale counterattack using all available artillery in Sevastopol against the German 132nd Rifle Division. The counterattack reached a distance of a kilometer behind the German front line, but the Soviet troops were exhausted both morally and in ammunition to gain anything from this success. By the end of the day they had lost the captured territory to effective German air attacks. In the south, Fretter-Picot also made another attempt to advance. The 401st Regiment of the German 72nd Infantry Division allowed it to advance two kilometers, and Fretter-Picot sent his reserves, the 266th Infantry Division, and captured one of the forts.

On June 13, Hansen's corps captured Fort Stalin, which was a weakly defended anti-aircraft position with three machine gun emplacements. Despite only having 200 soldiers inside, the fort's defenders fought bravely for over an hour before falling. At five thirty in the morning, when Soviet troops learned that Fort Stalin had fallen, the nearby Fort Volga opened fire on it, followed by a counterattack that failed to retake the fort. Almost all of the fort's two hundred defenders were dead. Not too large-scale, but brutal battles, like the one that took place at Fort Stalin, were repeated over the next few days in a war of attrition.

On June 16, Hansen sent the 132nd Infantry Division against Coastal Battery 30, Fort Maxim Gorky, while the 22nd and 24th Rifle Divisions attacked the center of the Soviet defense line, held by the Soviet 95th Rifle Division, penetrated the defenses, destroying the front line and leaving shore battery 30 by itself. The German 436th and 437th Infantry Regiments reached the fort and began the attack. An attack bomber destroyed the fort's west tower as the others were slowed down by lack of ammunition. Under such pressure, the entire northern defense line collapsed. While the Germans were methodically clearing Soviet bunkers with grenades and flamethrowers, on June 20 their troops reached Severnaya Bay. On June 21, after a two-day battle, the Germans captured Fort Lenin along with 158 prisoners. On June 23, Fort Konstantinovsky was captured. With the northern defenses defeated, Hansen's troops moved south, where Fretter-Picot advanced much more slowly.

To compensate for the slow progress of the corps, Romanian reinforcements were called in. Prior to this, the troops of Major General Georg Avramescu had not been assigned to carry out any major offensives. However, when they launched their first major offensive, they proved their worth by breaking through Soviet defenses near the Chernaya River, where the Germans failed, capturing a Soviet stronghold dubbed "Bastion II", and then repelling a counterattack. On June 27, Hansen's troops united with Avramescu's troops east of the Chernaya River.

On June 29, at night, German troops achieved the effect of complete surprise when they crossed the Northern Bay with the 902nd and 90th assault teams in 130 boats. Soviet forces realized what was happening too late and fired flares to alert headquarters when the coast was already captured. Petrov had at his disposal six T-26 tanks that could have been used to protect the coastline, but due to his indecisiveness the moment was lost. A German corps attacked in the south, defeating the Soviet 7th Naval Brigade and the 775th Rifle Regiment. German victories on the border of the Northern Bay and in the south cut off Soviet troops, weakening them for the upcoming attack on Sevastopol.

On the night of June 30, Soviet troops destroyed a large ammunition depot near Northern Bay to prevent the Germans from capturing it. This warehouse was located inside a champagne factory, whose buildings also served as a field hospital for 2,000 wounded, some of whom may still have been in the building when it collapsed.

On June 30, the order was given to evacuate Sevastopol. All defenses then fell as the soldiers fled in every possible way to save their lives. On July 1, Petrov and Oktyabrsky left the city on a submarine, leaving behind 23,000 people, many of them wounded. Later that day, German troops entered the city. Manstein tried to exclude the Romanians from the final offensive, not wanting to share the glory with them, but Major General Georg Manoli disobeyed the order, sending the 4th Mountain Division into the city and placing the Romanian flag on the Nakhimov statue. The final act of defiance was carried out by troops of the 109th Infantry Division fighting the bunkers around Shore Battery 35 and the men who were fighting on the runway at Cape Chersonesos. Both flanks were defeated on July 4th.

The result of the battle for Sevastopol

The battle for Sevastopol cost both sides a lot, even according to the most conservative estimates. About 18,000 Soviet soldiers died, 95,000 were captured, and only 25,157 were successfully evacuated. The German 11th Army suffered casualties of 4,264 dead, 21,626 wounded and 1,522 missing, for a total of approximately 27,000 soldiers. Romanian casualties were 1,597 dead, 6,571 wounded and 277 missing, for a total of 8,454.

The city itself was also heavily damaged, mainly due to prolonged and powerful artillery shelling, half of the buildings in Sevastopol were destroyed. The capture of Sevastopol was.

Epilogue

Even before the city was completely captured, Manstein received the rank of field marshal for his victory, and a vacation in Romania. As soon as he left, . For the next two years, Germany held the city and the killings continued under the control of SS Gruppenführer Alvenslieben.

The defense of Sevastopol is one of the large and extended military operations of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.

Background and position of troops

Ukraine was an important point for the Germans, the capture of which would allow fascist troops to open the way to Moscow from the south, as well as secure supplies of food and coal to continue military operations in the winter. By the end of September 1941, Hitler's troops were already able to capture Smolensk and. Leningrad was encircled, and significant successes were achieved in the South-Western direction - most of the Soviet troops in this direction were defeated, and the south-western part of Ukraine was already under the jurisdiction of the German command. In mid-September, fascist troops approached Crimea, another important point in the conquest of Ukraine.

Crimea was necessary for the Germans, as it was one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus. Moreover, aviation was based in Crimea; with the loss of the peninsula, the Soviet army would have lost the opportunity to carry out raids on Romania (which was under Hitler’s jurisdiction), and the Germans themselves would have been able to bomb the Caucasus. It was because of the importance of Crimea that the Soviet command decided to abandon and redirect troops from the city to the peninsula.

At the time the defense of Sevastopol began, the enemy forces were approximately equal.

Progress of the defense of Sevastopol

Since the operation was very lengthy, several main stages can be distinguished:

• the first German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from November 11 to November 21, 1941;
• the second German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from December 17 to December 31, 1941;
• relative calm, which lasted from early January to May 31, 1942;
• the third German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from June 7 to July 4, 1942.

On October 25, German troops broke through the defenses of the Soviet army at the Ishun positions and broke into Crimea - seven divisions and two Romanian detachments were supposed to occupy the peninsula in the shortest possible time. The Soviet command, seeing the pressure of the Germans, decided to retreat towards Kerch; later this part of the army went to Kuban. A smaller part of the Soviet troops began to retreat towards Sevastopol through the mountain passes of Crimea, and then along the coast. Both parts of the army were pursued by German troops, and a separate detachment of two German divisions headed directly towards Sevastopol to capture the city.

As a result, by November 1941, there were about 20 thousand Soviet troops in Sevastopol. On November 5, clashes began between Soviet and German troops on the approaches to the city.

First attack on Sevastopol

On November 11, several German divisions attacked Soviet troops on the approaches to the city, and the fighting continued until November 21. The Germans managed to advance several kilometers to the south and east, and the front line was established 12 km from Sevastopol. At the same time, the fighting subsided, both sides began to strengthen their armies, the Soviet received reinforcements in the form of soldiers and ammunition.

While the Soviet command in Sevastopol was strengthening the defense, German troops continued to seize Crimea, and as a result, by November 16, the entire peninsula, except for Sevastopol, was occupied by the Germans. The remaining fascist forces reformed and headed towards the city to break the last stronghold of Soviet defense.

Second attack on Sevastopol

Initially, the next attack on the city was planned for November 27, but due to a delay, the offensive began only on December 17, 1941. During a fierce battle, the Germans again managed to suppress Soviet resistance and significantly advance deeper to the north.

On December 19, Admiral Zhukov reported that the front without support would not hold out even until the 20th, but contrary to forecasts, the soldiers were able to hold back the Germans until December 21, after which reinforcements arrived in Sevastopol.

As a result, in two weeks of fighting the Germans managed to advance an average of 10 km towards the city. The offensive stopped on December 31 due to heavy losses suffered by the German army during the battles with Soviet defensive units.

January-May 1942

At the beginning of January, reinforcements again arrived in Sevastopol, and the German army, on the contrary, thinned out, since a significant part of it went to the east of Crimea. In January-February 1942, there were only minor skirmishes between German and Soviet troops. In general, this period can be considered relatively calm. Until May, the Soviet army was regularly replenished with new units.

Third attack on Sevastopol

On May 18, after the Germans managed to defeat the Soviet army in the east of Crimea, the German command again focused on Sevastopol: an assault on the city was planned, for which the Germans drove a large amount of heavy artillery to the borders.

On June 2, German artillery and aviation began to inflict heavy blows on Soviet troops in Sevastopol. On June 7, several German divisions launched a land offensive, while the Romanian army distracted Soviet soldiers with fighting in the east.

By June 17, the northern defense of Sevastopol was actually captured, and the Germans significantly advanced to the south. Although reinforcements were actively sent to the Soviet troops, this did not help. On June 29, 1942, the Germans entered Sevastopol.

On July 1, Sevastopol was completely occupied by the Germans, and the remnants of the Soviet troops went to Chersonesos, where fighting continued for some time. The Soviet soldiers who were waiting for evacuation did not wait for it and were captured.

Results of the defense of Sevastopol

The defense of Sevastopol went down in history as one of the most difficult and lengthy defensive operations, in which Soviet troops suffered heavy human losses. In addition, the surrender of Sevastopol was the last stage in the conquest of Crimea by the Germans, which opened up a number of new directions and opportunities for Hitler.

From a message from the Sovinformburo dated May 9, 1944: “Having broken the stubborn resistance of the enemy, our troops stormed the fortress and the most important naval base on the Black Sea - the city of SEVASTOPOL. Thus, the last center of German resistance in Crimea has been eliminated, and Crimea has been completely cleared of Nazi invaders!” During the Great Patriotic War, Crimea became the scene of the most fierce and bloody battles, a symbol of terrible losses, sacrifice and mass heroism of Soviet troops and sailors. It was here in 1941–1942. The Red Army suffered a series of crushing defeats. And here, in the spring of 1944, she won one of the most glorious victories - in the Crimean offensive operation, enemy losses for the first time were many times greater than ours. Who is to blame for the Crimean disaster of 1941? How did the Germans manage to break through our defenses at Perekop and capture the entire peninsula? At what cost did Sevastopol remain completely surrounded for eight months and why was it not possible to repel the third assault on the hero city? What made Hitler give the order to defend Crimea to the last possible opportunity, essentially dooming the 200,000-strong German-Romanian group to death? And how was the Red Army able to liberate the peninsula and take Sevastopol by storm in just a month, although it took Manstein ten times longer?

A series: Crimea - an outpost of Russian glory

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by liters company.

Disaster of 1941

For the defense of Crimea and the main naval base in Sevastopol, on August 15, the 51st Army was created as part of the Southern Front, consisting of the 9th Rifle Corps and the 48th Cavalry Division under the command of Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov. This army had the task of preventing the enemy from invading Crimea both from the north, through the Perekop and Chongar isthmuses, and from the sea approaches.

Against the Southern Front, whose commander was Lieutenant General D. I. Ryabyshev, a member of the Military Council of the front was Army Commissar 1st Rank A. I. Zaporozhets, and the chief of staff was Major General A. I. Antonov, the enemy moved to offensive on September 9. He managed to break through the front of the 9th Army and by the evening of September 12 reached the Perekop Isthmus, and on September 16 - to the Chongar Bridge and the Arabat Strelka. Thus, the enemy came close to the Crimean Peninsula, but his attempt to immediately break through the Perekop Isthmus was repulsed by the troops of the 51st Separate Army.

The troops of the Southern Front, commanded by Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko from October 5, at the end of September, on their own initiative, tried to organize an offensive in Northern Tavria with the aim of reaching the Crimean isthmuses and establishing direct communications with Crimea. But the Supreme Command Headquarters indicated to the front command that their efforts were untimely and that in the current situation it was advisable to improve their defensive positions. At the same time, the troops of the 51st Separate Army were ordered to hold the Crimean isthmus with all their might and prevent the enemy from breaking through into Crimea.

At the same time, the German High Command, which believed that the Red Army forces on the southern sector of the front had been defeated, set Army Group South the task of capturing Crimea and depriving the Black Sea Fleet of its main base, and Soviet aviation, which was bombing the Romanian oil industry, of airfields in Crimea .

By the time the enemy reached the Crimean isthmus (mid-September), three rifle divisions of the 51st Separate Army, whose troops were commanded by Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, were deployed for their defense.

The 11th German Army, commanded by Colonel General von Schobert, operated on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. But the commander in mid-September, during one of his daily sorties to the front on a Storch-type aircraft, landed on a field mined by the Russians and died along with his pilot, and on September 16 he was buried in Nikolaev. General Manstein was appointed as the new commander, who on September 17 arrived at the headquarters of the 11th Army in the city and port of Nikolaev, located at the mouth of the Bug, and took command. The chief of staff was Colonel Wehler.

The 11th Army was tasked with occupying Crimea. Moreover, this task seemed especially urgent to the German command. On the one hand, it was expected that the occupation of Crimea and its naval base of Sevastopol would have a beneficial effect on Turkey's position. On the other hand, and this is especially important, large enemy air bases in Crimea posed a threat to the Romanian oil region, which was vital for Germany. And finally, after the capture of Crimea, the mountain corps, part of the 11th Army, was supposed to continue moving through the Kerch Strait towards the Caucasus, supporting the offensive, which was supposed to unfold from Rostov.

For a direct attack on the Crimea, formations of the 54th Army Corps under the command of General Hansen were allocated as part of the 46th and 73rd infantry divisions. In addition, it was planned to send there part of the forces from the 50th Infantry Division, which had arrived from Greece, which at that time, as part of the 4th Romanian Army, was still located near Odessa, clearing the Black Sea coast of the remnants of Soviet troops.

Manstein believed that, given the terrain, “even the stubborn defense of three divisions was enough to prevent the invasion of the Crimea by the 54th Army Corps or, at least, to significantly exhaust its forces in the battles for the isthmus.” He explained this from the perspective of the complex nature of the terrain and the defense power of the Soviet troops. In particular, he wrote:

“Crimea is separated from the mainland by the so-called “Rotten Sea”, Sivash. It is a kind of wattle or salt marsh, for the most part impassable to infantry, and, owing to its shallow depth, it is, moreover, an absolute obstacle to landing craft. There are only two approaches to Crimea: in the west - the Perekop Isthmus, in the east - the Genichesk Isthmus. But this latter is so narrow that only the road and railway tracks fit on it, and even then they are interrupted by long bridges. This isthmus is unsuitable for conducting an offensive.

The Perekop Isthmus, the only one suitable for an offensive, is also only 7 km wide. The attack on it could only be carried out frontally; the terrain did not provide any hidden routes of approach. A flanking maneuver was ruled out, since there was sea on both sides. The isthmus was well equipped for defense with field-type structures. In addition, the entire width of it was crossed by the ancient “Tatar Ditch”, which has a depth of up to 15 m.

After breaking through the Perekop Isthmus, the attacker found himself further south on another isthmus - Ishunsky, where the offensive zone of the German troops, due to the narrowing between the salt lakes, was reduced to 3-4 km.

Given these terrain features and taking into account that the enemy had air superiority, it could be assumed that the battle for the isthmuses would be difficult and exhausting. Even if it were possible to achieve a breakthrough at Perekop, it remained doubtful whether the corps would have enough strength to carry out a second battle at Yishun. But, in any case, 2-3 divisions were clearly not enough to occupy the entire Crimea, including the powerful fortress of Sevastopol.”

Clarification of operational tasks at A. Hitler's headquarters

Despite such dubious prospects, on September 24, the enemy’s 54th Army Corps launched an attack on the Perekop Isthmus. Despite the resistance of the Soviet troops, the corps managed, repelling strong counterattacks, to take Perekop and overcome the “Tatar Ditch” on September 26.

During these battles, the Soviet command threw all their tanks, including the T-34, against the enemy. A German engineer officer describes the first meeting with these tanks (in the text - “heavy tanks”) in the battles for the Perekop positions:

“...We had barely crossed the ditch when heavy tanks attacked us from the direction of Armyansk. One of my Rottenführers, to everyone's amusement, opened fire with a completely useless anti-tank rifle - an "infantry door knocker". We were saved by a Romanian battery of heavy howitzers, whose shells tore out huge craters, and Stalin’s tanks had to retreat.” These were the latest for that time 149-mm howitzers from Skoda, model 1934 and 1937.

In the next three days of the most difficult offensive, the corps broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops to its entire depth, took the heavily fortified settlement of Armyansk and entered the operational space. The remnants of the divisions of the 51st Army retreated to the Ishun Isthmus with heavy losses; according to Manstein, German troops captured 10,000 prisoners, 112 tanks and 135 guns.

But later, as a result of counterattacks carried out at that time by the troops of the 9th and 18th armies of the Southern Front, German troops were forced to stop the attack on Crimea. At the same time, the enemy’s breakthrough of the first line of Perekop fortifications of Soviet troops indicated the insufficient strength of the Crimean defense. Having no free units to strengthen the 51st Separate Army, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided on September 30 to evacuate the Odessa defensive region and, at the expense of its troops, strengthen the defense of the Crimean Peninsula. Before the arrival of troops from Odessa, which required about three weeks, the commander of the 51st Separate Army was ordered to concentrate all forces to hold the Arabat Spit, the Chongar Isthmus, the southern bank of Sivash and the Ishun positions.

The “New Order” was established with the help of gallows

While the evacuation of Odessa and the transfer of troops to the Crimea were carried out, the enemy, continuing to advance in the general offensive towards Rostov, pushed the troops of the Southern Front to Taganrog and was able to resume the offensive on the Crimea. This time, for the invasion of Crimea, the German command allocated the 11th Army with the Romanian mountain corps, a total of seven German infantry divisions and two Romanian brigades.

Manstein decided to deliver the main blow with German divisions across the Perekop Isthmus; auxiliary - by the Romanian mountain corps across the Chongar bridge. To do this, by October 18, four infantry divisions of the 54th Army Corps were concentrated on the Perekop Isthmus. Two more divisions of the 30th Army Corps, heading towards Perekop, were located halfway between Genichesk and Perekop. Another division, the German 132nd, was at that time approaching the Southern Bug River. The Romanian mountain corps concentrated towards Genichesk.

Soviet troops in Crimea, together with the arriving four rifle and one cavalry divisions of the Primorsky Army, consisted of 12 rifle and four cavalry divisions on October 18. These forces were quite sufficient to organize a strong defense of the Crimean isthmuses. And since our fleet dominated the Black Sea, the possibility of an enemy amphibious landing was excluded. An enemy airborne landing in Crimea was also unlikely.

However, the commander of the 51st Army failed to correctly assess the situation and scattered his forces throughout the peninsula. He kept three rifle and two cavalry divisions guarding the coast, two rifle and one cavalry divisions in reserve. To defend the isthmuses, four rifle divisions were deployed in the Ishun positions in one echelon and one rifle division on the Chongar Peninsula. Two divisions of the Primorsky Army were on the march from Sevastopol to the isthmuses and could arrive there no earlier than October 23.

The enemy, having launched an offensive on the Ishun positions on October 18, delivered the main blow with two divisions in a narrow area between the railway and the Black Sea coast. On October 20, he managed to break through the Ishun fortifications. Instead of organizing counterattacks on the flank of the enemy who had broken through, the commander of the 51st Army sought to close the resulting breakthrough and only on October 23 launched a frontal counterattack with the forces of the approaching 25th and 95th Infantry Divisions of the Primorsky Army. This counterattack managed to delay the advance of the Nazi troops until October 25. But with the loss of the Ishun positions convenient for defense, our troops found themselves at a disadvantage in positions that were almost unprepared for defense.

This is the opinion of Soviet historians. Therefore, the opinion of the other side, expressed by General Manstein, is of considerable interest. In particular, in the book “Lost Victories” he writes:

“Our immediate task was to resume fighting on the approaches to the Crimea, for the Ishun Isthmus. They may say that this is the most ordinary attack. But these ten-day battles stand out from ordinary offensives as the clearest example of the offensive spirit and selfless dedication of the German soldier. In this battle we had almost none of the prerequisites that are usually considered necessary for an attack on a fortified defense.

Numerical superiority was on the side of the defending Russians, and not on the side of the advancing Germans. The six divisions of the 11th Army were very soon opposed by 8 Soviet rifle and four cavalry divisions, since on October 16 the Russians evacuated the fortress of Odessa, which was unsuccessfully besieged by the 4th Romanian Army, and transferred the army defending it by sea to the Crimea. And although our aviation reported that Soviet ships with a total tonnage of 32,000 tons were sunk, most of the transport from Odessa reached Sevastopol and ports on the western coast of Crimea. The first of the divisions of this army appeared at the front soon after the start of our offensive.

German artillery had superiority over enemy artillery and effectively supported the infantry. But on the enemy’s side, on the northwestern coast of Crimea and on the southern bank of Sivash, armored batteries of coastal artillery operated, so far invulnerable to German artillery. While the Soviets had numerous tanks for counterattacks, the 11th Army had none.

Dominance in the air belonged to Soviet aviation. Soviet bombers and fighters continuously attacked any detected target. Not only the infantry at the front line and batteries had to dig in, but trenches had to be dug for every cart and horse in the rear zone to protect them from enemy aircraft. Things got to the point that anti-aircraft batteries did not dare to open fire, so as not to be immediately suppressed by an air raid. Only when Mölders and his fighter squadron were subordinated to the army was he able to clear the skies, at least during the daytime. At night, he could not prevent enemy air raids.

Reconnaissance of the area before a new battle

On October 25, it seemed that the offensive impulse of the troops had completely dried up. The commander of one of the best divisions had already reported twice that the strength of his regiments was running out... Nevertheless, on October 27, decisive success was achieved. On October 28, after ten days of fierce fighting, the Soviet defenses collapsed and the 11th Army could begin pursuit of the enemy."

To unite the actions of the troops of the 51st and Primorsky Separate Army and the Black Sea Fleet for the defense of Crimea, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a command of the Crimean troops was created. Vice Admiral G.I. Levchenko was appointed commander, and Lieutenant General P.I. Batov was appointed deputy for ground forces.

After the defeat at the Yishun positions, the divisions of the Primorsky Army began to retreat south, and the four rifle divisions of the 51st Army, against which five German divisions were advancing, slowly retreated in the direction of Dzhankoy.

Manstein ordered the troops of the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the 72nd and 22nd Infantry Divisions, to advance to Simferopol. The 54th Army Corps, part of the 50th Army, the newly arrived 132nd Infantry Division and a hastily formed motorized brigade were ordered to pursue the enemy in the Bakhchisarai-Sevastopol direction.

On October 29, the commander of the Crimean troops decided to withdraw the troops of the Primorsky and 51st armies to a poorly prepared rear defensive line, running along the Sovetsky, Novo-Tsaritsyno, Saki line, and gain a foothold on it. But in practice, this decision could not be implemented, since on October 31, the enemy’s mobile detachment reached the Alma station, and after it the divisions of the 54th Army Corps advanced.

In order to prevent enemy troops from breaking through to Sevastopol, whose garrison was very weak at that time, it was decided to withdraw the troops of the Primorsky Army to Sevastopol and organize the defense of this port city there, and cover the Kerch direction with the 51st Army. As a result of this decision, the forces of the Soviet troops in Crimea were divided into two parts, and the enemy was able to defeat them piece by piece.

The retreat to Sevastopol took place under difficult conditions. Soviet troops waged continuous battles with the enemy's 30th Army Corps, which was pressing on them and turned south from Dzhankoy. On November 6, the advanced units of the Primorsky Army reached Sevastopol just at the moment when the city’s garrison, consisting mainly of marines, was repelling at the forefront the attacks of the 54th Army Corps, which was trying to break through to the city from the east along the shortest direction. With the approach of the troops of the Primorsky Army, the forces of the defenders

Sevastopol increased, which gave them the opportunity to repel the enemy's advance.

At a time when the troops of the Primorsky Army were retreating to Sevastopol, the 51st Army, which Lieutenant General P.I. Batov took command of the troops on October 30, was withdrawn for the defense of the Kerch Peninsula. On November 4, by order of the commander of the Crimean troops, the Kerch defensive region was created on the basis of the 51st Army, which included all formations and units of the 51st Army and the Kerch naval base.

Despite the terrain convenient for defense and sufficient forces (seven rifle divisions), the command of the defensive region was unable to organize the defense of the Kerch Peninsula and stop the enemy’s offensive. On November 16, the last units of the 51st Army were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula.

Thus, by mid-November 1941, the enemy captured almost the entire Crimea and blocked Sevastopol from land. The main base of the Black Sea Fleet found itself under fire from German field artillery and under attack from German aviation, which had relocated to Crimean airfields. Because of this, the Black Sea Fleet, except for a few old ships left for fire support of the Sevastopol garrison, had to be relocated to inconvenient ports on the Caucasian coast. The advance of the enemy to the Kerch Strait made it difficult for our fleet to communicate between the Azov and Black Seas.

From the memoirs of E. Manstein: “On November 16, the persecution was completed, and the entire Crimea, with the exception of the Sevastopol fortress region, was in our hands.

The swift actions of the 42nd Army Corps thwarted the enemy's attempt to resist us on the Parpach Isthmus. The corps took the important port of Feodosia before the enemy managed to evacuate any significant forces through it. On November 15, the corps took Kerch. Only insignificant enemy forces managed to cross the strait to the Taman Peninsula.

The 30th Army Corps managed to split the main enemy forces into two parts, making a bold breakthrough along the mountain road to Alushta, located on the southern bank, after Simferopol was taken on November 1 by the advance detachment of the 72nd Infantry Division. The enemy was thus not only deprived of the opportunity to create a defense on the northern spurs of the mountains, but all his forces, pushed into the mountains east of the Simferopol-Alushta road, were doomed to destruction.

Column of Soviet prisoners of war

Although the pursuit thus failed to end with the capture of the fortress of Sevastopol, it nevertheless led to the almost complete destruction of the enemy outside it. The six divisions of the 11th Army destroyed most of the enemy's two armies, which numbered 12 rifle and four cavalry divisions. Only the remnants of the troops, having lost all their heavy weapons, escaped through the Kerch Strait and retreated to Sevastopol. If they were soon able to be transformed into full-fledged combat-ready troops in Sevastopol, it was due to the fact that the enemy, having dominance at sea, was able to ensure the timely delivery of reinforcements and equipment.

On December 26, the enemy, having transported two divisions across the Kerch Gulf, landed troops on both sides of the city of Kerch. This was followed by the landing of smaller troops on the northern coast of the peninsula.

The landing of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula, undertaken just at the moment when the outcome of the battle on the northern sector of the Sevastopol Front was being decided, as it soon turned out, was not just an enemy maneuver designed to divert our forces. Soviet radio stations reported that this was an offensive with a decisive goal, with the goal of returning Crimea, carried out on the orders and plans of Stalin. As it was announced on the radio, the fight would only end with the destruction of the 11th Army in the Crimea, and the fact that these words were not an empty threat was soon confirmed by the large mass of troops thrown into this offensive. In this circumstance, as well as in the fact that the enemy wasted his strength without taking anything into account, Stalin’s cruel will was felt.

On December 28, 1941, the 54th Army Corps launched its final offensive near Sevastopol... The 46th Infantry Division made a forced march to the Parpach Isthmus. But at the same time she had to leave most of her guns on the icy roads. Moreover, its personnel were completely exhausted by the hardships of this retreat. Following the 46th Infantry Division, the enemy was immediately able to begin pursuit from the small bridgeheads remaining behind him. The Kerch Strait froze, which allowed the enemy to quickly bring up new forces.

If the enemy took advantage of the created situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would have been created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerging sector of the Eastern Front of the 11th Army. The fate of the entire 11th Army would be decided.

I. V. Tyulenev. Commander of the Southern Front (06/25–08/30/1941)

But the enemy failed to take advantage of the favorable moment. Either the enemy command did not understand its advantages in this situation, or it did not dare to immediately use them. From the operational maps we captured, it was clear that the 44th Army, which landed at Feodosia, had only one goal - to reach the area west and north-west of the city of Old Crimea by January 4 with the six divisions it had at its disposal by that time, in order to then take up defense on milestone reached. Apparently, even having a triple superiority in forces, the enemy did not dare to undertake a bold deep operation that could lead to the defeat of the 11th Army. Obviously, he wanted to accumulate even more strength first. But the enemy did not actually reach even the above-mentioned line west of the city of Old Crimea.

The 51st Army advancing through Kerch pursued the 46th Infantry Division very hesitantly. The 44th Army, which landed at Feodosia, initially undertook only cautious forays in the decisive western and northwestern directions. To our surprise, she sent her main forces not in this direction, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. The enemy clearly saw only his tactical goal - the destruction of our forces on the Kerch Peninsula - and completely lost sight of the operational goal: crossing the main vital artery of the 11th Army.

Thus, by the end of 1941, the way to the vital artery of the 11th Army: the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway was actually open to the enemy troops who had landed at Feodosia and were approaching from Kerch. The weak security front that we managed to create could not withstand the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia area. Until the divisions brought up from Sevastopol arrived, the fate of the 11th Army really hung in the balance. However, the enemy tried to prevent the withdrawal of troops from the Sevastopol front, now launching an offensive on our new and insufficiently fortified positions.

Proof that we treated the prisoners well was their own behavior during the Soviet landing near Feodosia. There was a camp with 8,000 prisoners, the guards of which fled. However, these 8,000 people did not at all rush into the arms of their “liberators”, but, on the contrary, marched without security in the direction of Simferopol, that is, to us.”

N. G. Kuznetsov. In 1941 - People's Commissar of the USSR Navy

Thus, the capture of almost the entire Crimea by German troops in 1941 should be regarded as a significant victory of German weapons on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front and as a major failure of the Soviet command in the most important strategic direction. With the fall of Odessa and the seizure of Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet lost the ability to freely maneuver in a significant part of the Black Sea and practically found itself pressed against the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, where there were no basing ports convenient for it. From the Crimean side, the Germans were able to influence the territory of the Krasnodar Territory and the North Caucasus.

True, in 1941 Kerch and Sevastopol still held out. Later, Soviet historians wrote that in 1941, Soviet troops pinned down the 11th German Army in the Crimea, not allowing the fascist German command to use it either to attack the Caucasus through the Kerch Strait, or to provide assistance to the 1st Tank Army, on which was struck by our troops near Rostov in the second half of November.

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The given introductory fragment of the book Battle of Crimea 1941–1944 From defeat to triumph (V. A. Runov, 2014) provided by our book partner -

Throughout the summer of 1854, the Anglo-French fleet prepared for a landing in the Crimea. Their goal was the naval base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol. It was the defense of Sevastopol in 1854-1855. was a turning point in the Crimean War, one of its most tragic and majestic pages.

Beginning of hostilities in Crimea

Lord Raglan and Saint-Arnaud were appointed troops of the coalition forces of the Anglo-French and Turkish troops. Commander of the Russian troops A.S. Menshikov, due to his shortsightedness, did not immediately understand that the Allies’ goal was to capture Sevastopol.

• September 13, 1854 Allied troops from England, France, Turkey and Italy landed troops near Yevpatoria, then occupied the city without a fight, and coalition forces began advancing deeper into the Crimean Peninsula.
• September 20, 1854 Menshikov made an attempt to stop the advance of the Anglo-French-Turkish troops, the number of which reached about 72 thousand soldiers. The battle on the Alma River did not bring the desired result. After the defeat on Alma, Russian troops, by order of the same Menshikov, began to retreat to Bakhchisarai, leaving Sevastopol practically unprotected.

From the sea side, Sevastopol was well protected. Russian coastal artillery batteries could shoot ships in a roadstead at a distance of 2.5 kilometers. The Alexander Battery, built in 1846 and having the appearance of a fortress, was considered especially effective. Unfortunately, the military potential of the Alexander Battery was practically not used. From the sea side, Sevastopol remained unprotected due to the long absence of a potential enemy.

• The overall commander of all the main forces of the coalition, Saint-Arnaud, made an unforgivable mistake when he considered that the Allied troops would not be able to immediately take Sevastopol and decided to bypass the city from the south. Thus, he gave a short respite to the Sevastopol garrison to build fortifications.

The garrison of Sevastopol began intensively preparing for defense and building fortifications. Disagreements arose between Russian admirals Kornilov and Nakhimov: V.A. Kornilov wanted to organize a naval battle with the Anglo-French fleet, P.S. Nakhimov proposed to sink some of the ships in order to prevent the Allied fleet from entering the bays. As a result, some of the ships of the Russian fleet were sunk, and their crews went ashore, thereby strengthening the Sevastopol garrison.

Defense of Sevastopol in 1854

Admirals Nakhimov P.S., Kornilov V.A. and Istomin V.I. took command of the defense of Sevastopol. The scheme of the most important fortifications of the city was developed by the brilliant general engineer Totleben. Under his leadership, bastions were built from earthen ramparts with living quarters for soldiers, reinforced with sandbags and large baskets of earth, which corresponded to the modern conditions of military operations of those times.

• October 5, 1854 coalition troops began the first bombardment of Sevastopol. This day is considered to be the beginning of the siege of Sevastopol. The Allies concentrated the main fire on Russian batteries located on Malakhov Kurgan, the key height of the naval base. Although the Allied bombing caused heavy losses in the Russian camp, return fire from Russian artillery blew up three gunpowder magazines and seriously damaged four Allied ships. On this day, Admiral Kornilov was mortally wounded on Malakhov Kurgan. The main command of the defense passed to Nakhimov. On March 19, 1855, Istomin also died on the Malakhov Kurgan.

• Having suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, the Allies did not dare to launch an immediate assault on Sevastopol, which its defenders took advantage of. Russian soldiers and sailors rebuilt destroyed fortifications and replaced damaged guns. They were prepared for a long siege.
• October 25, 1854 The battle of Balaklava took place. Prince Menshikov tried to divert coalition forces from besieged Sevastopol. This battle did not bring a decisive advantage to either side. Russian troops managed to recapture part of the Turkish redoubts and inflict heavy losses on the British. However, the siege was not lifted.
• November 5, 1854 The Battle of Inkerman took place. Another attempt by Prince Menshikov to divert part of the Allied forces to himself. Although the attack by units of the Russian army had initial success, it was not possible to consolidate it. In addition, the Russian troops suffered significant damage due to the difference in the class of weapons - the Russian army did not have rifled guns (fittings) and cannons, unlike the French and British.

Emperor Nicholas I was extremely dissatisfied with the unsuccessful actions of the Russian army in Crimea. He demanded immediate decisive action from Menshikov.

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Defense of Sevastopol in 1855

At the end of January 1855, Menshikov received fresh reinforcements from Russia. But after futile attempts to lift the siege of Sevastopol, this commander began to fall into despair.

• January 26, 1855 Sardinia took the side of the coalition. Pelissier became the new commander of the combined forces of the Allies.
• February 17, 1855 Menshikov ordered General Khrulev to attack Yevpatoria with a division of 20 thousand people. However, having lost about 700 soldiers, Khrulev abandoned further attacks on the city. Having received news of Prince Menshikov's next failure, Nicholas I removed him from command. Artillery General M.D. Gorchakov was appointed the new commander of the Russian troops.
• The Allies constantly received new reinforcements, ammunition and food by sea, while the forces of the defenders of Sevastopol were melting away. By the beginning of 1855, the garrison of Sevastopol numbered approximately 40 thousand people. The number of combined Anglo-French and Turkish forces by the beginning of 1855 reached 130 thousand. The conspirators began to prepare for a decisive assault on Sevastopol. The French engineer Niel arrived to carry out the siege work. All efforts were directed mainly against the Malakhov Kurgan.
• April 9, 1855 The allies launched a second fierce bombardment; after a series of night attacks by Anglo-French forces, a general assault on Sevastopol was expected. But it never took place.

The key figure in the city's defense was P. S. Nakhimov. Sailors and soldiers called him “father” and “our soul.” This may seem incredible, but Nakhimov knew almost all the soldiers and sailors of the garrison by sight. On June 28, 1855, the favorite of sailors and soldiers was mortally wounded while walking around the Malakhov Kurgan. This was a real tragedy for the hero city. Speaking briefly about the participants in the defense of Sevastopol, one cannot fail to note the participation of children and women in the hostilities. In the intervals between shelling of Sevastopol, children brought food and ammunition to the bastions. The first Russian sisters of mercy also appeared, one of them was Daria Lavrentievna Mikhailova, nicknamed Daria of Sevastopol. Under artillery fire, she picked up the wounded on the battlefield, not only Russians, but also enemy soldiers. One of the most famous heroes of Sevastopol was the sailor Pyotr Koshka.

Rice. 2. Admiral Nakhimov on the 5th bastion. Pryashnikov I.M..

• May 26, 1855 all the advanced structures of the Ship side, including the Kamchatka Lunette, located directly in front of the Malakhov Kurgan, were captured by the French. General Khrulev made a number of unsuccessful attempts to recapture the redoubts from the enemy.
• June 3, 1855 At the cost of huge losses, the allies under the leadership of Pelissier managed to capture the Fedyukhin Heights. The position of the besieged garrison became more and more desperate. Gorchakov ordered the construction of a bridge for the withdrawal of troops from Sevastopol.
• September 4, 1855 The most fierce bombing of the city began. Sevastopol was burning. The batteries of the besieged Russian garrison could no longer respond to the fire of the enemy batteries. Immediately after the shelling, a general assault on Sevastopol by Anglo-French troops began. Malakhov Kurgan was taken by French units, attacks were repulsed in other areas, but this no longer mattered.

After the capture of Malakhov Kurgan, further defense of the city lost its meaning. Gorchakov ordered the troops to be withdrawn to the northern side. The French and British did not dare to enter the city for a long time, because they were afraid that it was mined.

The outcome of the war after the fall of Sevastopol became obvious: the Russian army was exsanguinated by losses in manpower and equipment, there was not enough money for its further supply, and due to the lag in industry, the internal economy of the Russian Empire was upset. The new Russian Emperor Alexander II asked for peace.

What have we learned?

The defense of Sevastopol in the Crimean War went down in Russian history as one of its most majestic pages, on which every line was written with the blood of its defenders. This article tells about how the siege was conducted and the most important events in the defense of Sevastopol.

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