Afghan War 1979-1989 - long-term political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) - on the one hand, and mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of Afghan society sympathetic to them, with political and financial support of foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.
The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in accordance with the secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 176/125 "To the position in" A "", "in order to prevent aggression from outside and strengthen the southern borders friendly regime in Afghanistan ”. The decision was taken by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).
To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from among the emerging KGB special unit "Vympel" killed the current president H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By Moscow's decision, the new leader of Afghanistan was a protege of the USSR, former Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague B. Karmal, whose regime received significant and versatile - military, financial and humanitarian - support of the Soviet Union.

Background
"Big game"
Afghanistan is located in the heart of Eurasia, which allows it to play an important role in relations between neighboring regions.
From the beginning of the 19th century, a struggle for control over Afghanistan began between the Russian and British empires, which was called The Great Game.
Anglo-Afghan wars
The British tried to forcefully establish domination over Afghanistan, sending troops from neighboring British India in January 1839. This is how the first Anglo-Afghan war began. Initially, success was accompanied by the British - they managed to overthrow the Emir of Dost Mohammed and put Shuja Khan on the throne. The reign of Shuja Khan, however, did not last long and in 1842 he was overthrown. Afghanistan signed a peace treaty with Britain and retained its independence.
Meanwhile, the Russian Empire continued to actively advance south. In the 1860-1880s, the annexation of Central Asia to Russia was mainly completed.
The British, worried about the rapid advance of Russian troops to the borders of Afghanistan, began the second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878. A stubborn struggle lasted two years and in 1880 the British were forced to leave the country, but at the same time leaving the loyal Emir Abdur-Rahman on the throne and thus retaining control over the country.
In the 1880-1890s, the modern borders of Afghanistan were formed, determined by joint agreements between Russia and Britain.
Independence of Afghanistan
In 1919, Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan's independence from Great Britain. The third Anglo-Afghan war began.
The first state to recognize independence was Soviet Russia, which provided Afghanistan with significant economic and military assistance.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a backward agrarian country with a complete lack of industry, an extremely poor population, more than half of which were illiterate.

Republic of Daoud
In 1973, during the visit of the King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah to Italy, a coup d'etat took place in the country. Power was seized by a relative of Zahir Shah, Mohammed Daoud, who proclaimed the first republic in Afghanistan.
Daoud established an authoritarian dictatorship and tried to implement reforms, but most of them ended in failure. The first republican period in the history of Afghanistan is characterized by strong political instability, rivalry between pro-communist and Islamist groups. The Islamists raised several uprisings, but all of them were suppressed by government forces.
Daoud's reign ended with the Saur revolution in April 1978, as well as the execution of the president and all members of his family.
Saur revolution
On April 27, 1978, the April (Saur) Revolution began in Afghanistan, as a result of which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, which proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would make it possible to overcome the lag of Afghanistan met with resistance from the Islamic opposition. Since 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

The course of the war
Decision-making on the introduction of Soviet troops
In March 1979, during the mutiny in the city of Herat, the first request from the Afghan leadership for direct Soviet military intervention followed (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.
However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Afghan border, and by order of Defense Minister D.F.Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan.
British soldiers in Kandahar, second Anglo-Afghan war
The further development of the situation in Afghanistan - armed demonstrations of the Islamic opposition, riots in the army, internal party struggles and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of H. Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious anxiety among the Soviet manuals. It watchfully watched Amin's activities at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under H. Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against the Islamists, but also against the PDPA members who were Taraki's supporters. The repressions also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which led to the fall of its already low morale and caused mass desertions and revolts. The Soviet leadership feared that a further exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, the KGB received information about Amin's connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.
As a result, it was decided to prepare the overthrow of Amin and replace him with a leader more loyal to the USSR. B. Karmal was considered as such, whose candidacy was supported by the chairman of the KGB, Yu. V. Andropov.
When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use the requests of Amin himself for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979, there were 7 such appeals. In early December 1979, the so-called "Muslim battalion" was sent to Bagram - a special task force of the GRU - specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and carry out special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F.Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that in the near future, obviously, a decision would be made on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal order of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. Chief of the General Staff N. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.
The decision to bring in troops was made at a meeting of the Politburo on December 12, 1979
To the position in "A".
1. To approve the considerations and measures outlined by vols. Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov DF, Gromyko AA Allow them to make adjustments of a non-fundamental nature in the course of these measures. Questions requiring a decision by the Central Committee should be submitted to the Politburo in a timely manner. The implementation of all these activities shall be entrusted to Comrades. Andropova Yu.V., Ustinova D.F., Gromyko A.A.
2. Instruct com. Yu. V. Andropov, DF Ustinov, AA Gromyko to inform the Politburo of the Central Committee about the progress of the planned measures. "
According to V.I.Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A.N. Kosygin, and from that moment A.N. Kosygin had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage ...
Mohammed Daoud
On December 13, 1979, the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense for Afghanistan was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev, which began work in the Turkestan military district on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment was sent to Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which since July 7, 1979 has been guarding the Soviet military in Bagram. -transport aircraft and helicopters.
At the same time B. Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet servicemen. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to kill Amin, but he survived, and B. Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, a "Muslim battalion" was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which entered the guard brigade of Amin's palace, which greatly facilitated the preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation in mid-December, 2 KGB special groups also arrived in Afghanistan.
Until December 25, 1979, in the Turkestan military district, the field administration of the 40th combined-arms army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an airborne assault brigade, combat and logistics support units were prepared for entering Afghanistan, and in the Central Asian military district - two motorized rifle regiments, a mixed air corps department, 2 fighter-bombers, 1 fighter air regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, aviation technical and airfield support units. Three more divisions were mobilized as a reserve in both districts. More than 50 thousand people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up to complete the units, about 8 thousand cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. It was the largest mobilization deployment of the Soviet Army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for transfer to Afghanistan, which was transferred to airfields in the Turkestan Military District on December 14.
By the evening of December 23, 1979, it was reported about the readiness of troops to enter Afghanistan. On December 24, D. F. Ustinov signed directive No. 312/12/001, which stated:
"A decision was made to bring some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of our country to the territory of the DRA in order to provide assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as to create favorable conditions for prohibiting possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring states."
The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purpose of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, DF Ustinov's order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and secure important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active operations against opposition units, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to cross at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade crossed the built pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked to capture the high-mountain pass Salang on the Termez-Kabul road in order to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops.
The streets of Kabul the day after the revolution, April 28, 1978
In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division by noon on December 27 completed the landing method and took control of the airport, blocking the Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division were concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government agencies, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important facilities in and around the city. After a clash with Afghan servicemen, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment were established over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was brought back to Afghanistan on December 23 with a group of his closest supporters.
Storming the palace of Amin
On the evening of December 27, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, during the assault, Amin was killed. State institutions in Kabul were captured by Soviet paratroopers.
On the night of December 27-28, B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram and the radio of Kabul broadcast the appeal of this new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the "second stage of the revolution" was proclaimed.

Main events
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, December 1979.
1979
In July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Airborne Regiment (111pdp) of the 105th Airborne Division (105th Airborne Division) arrived in Bagram, the 103rd Airborne Division also arrived in Kabul, in fact, after a regular reorganization in 1979 year - a separate battalion 345opdp. These were the first military units and units of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.
From December 9 to December 12, the first "Muslim battalion" arrived in Afghanistan - 154ooSpN 15obrSpN.
On December 14, another separate battalion 345opdp arrived in Bagram.
On December 25, columns of the 40th Army (40A) of the Turkestan Military District cross the Afghan border along a pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to provide assistance to the troops being introduced.
On the evening of December 27, Operation Storm took place - the storming of Amin's palace.
1980
Mujahideen of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, 1987.
January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government mutiny by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. About 100 rebels were killed during the battle; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded. At the same time, a directive from the Minister of Defense D. Ustinov appeared on the planning and beginning of hostilities - raids against rebel groups in the northern regions of Afghanistan adjacent to the Soviet border, by the forces of a no less reinforced battalion and the use of fire weapons of the army, including the Air Force to suppress resistance.
February 23 - tragedy in a tunnel on the Salang pass. During the passage of the tunnel by subdivisions 186msp and 2zrbr, in the complete absence of commandant service, a traffic jam formed in the middle of the tunnel due to an accident. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen of the 2nd brigade were suffocated. There is no data on the suffocated Afghans.
February-March - the first major operation to suppress an armed rebellion in a mountain regiment in Asmara, Kunar province of the OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar offensive. On February 28-29, units of the 317th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the Asmar area entered heavy bloody battles, as a result of the blocking of the 3rd Airborne Battalion by the dushmans in the Asmara Gorge. 33 people were killed, 40 were wounded, and one serviceman was missing.
April - US Congress authorizes $ 15,000,000 of "direct and overt aid" to the Afghan opposition.
- the first military operation in Panjshir.
Opposition forces in Afghanistan, according to the CIA, in September 1985.
May 11 - the death of the 1st motorized rifle company of the 66th Omsb Brigade (Jalalabad) near the village of Khara, Kunar province.
June 19 - the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to withdraw some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
August 3 - the battle near the village of Shaesta. The 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division was ambushed in the Mashhad Gorge - the Kishim region near the town of Faizabad, 48 servicemen were killed, 49 were wounded. It was one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the Afghan war.
August 12 - arrival in the country of the special forces of the KGB of the USSR "Karpaty".
September 23 - Lieutenant General Boris Tkach is appointed Commander of the 40th Army.
1981
September - fighting in the Lurkokh mountain range in the Farah province; death of Major General Khakhalov.
October 29 - the entry of the second "Muslim battalion" (177oSpN) under the command of Major Kerimbayev ("Kara-Major").
December - the defeat of the opposition base point in the Darzab region (Jowzjan province).
1982
An Afghan mujahid with the Strela-2 portable anti-aircraft missile system, August 26, 1988.
April 5 - During the military operation in the west of Afghanistan, Soviet troops mistakenly invaded Iranian territory. Iranian military aircraft destroyed two Soviet helicopters.
In May-June, the fifth Panjshir operation was carried out, during which a mass landing was carried out for the first time in Afghanistan: in the first three days alone, over 4,000 airborne personnel were parachuted. All in all, about 12,000 servicemen of various types of troops took part in this confrontation. The operation took place simultaneously for the entire 120 km deep into the gorge. As a result of this operation, Panjshir was taken.
November 3 - tragedy at the Salang Pass. More than 176 people died as a result of a traffic jam outside the tunnel.
November 15 - meeting of Yu. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani president, during which he informed him about the "new flexible policy of the Soviet side and the understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis." The meeting also discussed the feasibility of the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops from Pakistan, it was required to refuse to help the rebels.
1983
The Taj Bek Palace in Kabul in 1987, the headquarters of the OCCWA, the former residence of Amin.
January 2 - In Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen abducted a group of 16 Soviet “civilian specialists”.
February 2 - The hostages abducted in Mazar-i-Sharif and in the village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan were released, but six of them died.
March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordovez with Y. Andropov. Andropov thanks the UN for "understanding the problem" and assures the mediators that he is ready to take "certain steps", but doubts that Pakistan and the United States will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
April - Operation to defeat opposition units in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan "to set a timetable for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops."
July - Mujahideen attack on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
August - the hard work of D. Cordovez's mission to prepare agreements for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of the Politburo meetings. Now it was only about the "dialogue with the UN".
Winter - hostilities intensified in the region of Sarobi and the Jalalabad Valley (in the reports, the province of Laghman is most often mentioned). For the first time, armed opposition units remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and bases of resistance began directly in the country.
1984
Kunar Province, 1987.
January 16 - Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft from Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first time that MANPADS have been successfully used in Afghanistan.
April 30 - in the Khazar gorge, during a large-scale military operation in the Panjshir gorge, the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
October 27 - Mujahideen shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft over Kabul from Strela MANPADS.
1985
April 21 - Death of the Maravara company.
April 26 - the uprising of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war in the Badaber prison, located in Pakistan.
May 25 - Kunar Operation. Battle near the village of Konyak, Pechdara gorge, Kunar province of the 4th company, 149th Guards. Motorized rifle regiment. Finding themselves in the ring of the surrounded mujahideen and Pakistani mercenaries - "Black Storks", the guardsmen of the 4th company and the forces of the 2nd battalion attached to it lost 23 dead and 28 wounded.
June - Army operation in Panjshir.
Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee towards a political solution to the "Afghan problem".
October 16-17 - Shutulian tragedy (20 dead, several dozen wounded)
The main task of the 40th Army is to cover the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of strongholds in hard-to-reach regions of the country began.
On November 22, 1985, while performing a mission, the outpost of the Motor-Maneuvering Group (MMG) of the Panfilov border detachment of the Eastern border district of the KGB of the USSR was ambushed. 19 border guards were killed in the battle near the Afrij village in the Zardev Gorge of the Badakhshan province. These were the largest losses of border guards in one battle in the Afghan war 1979-1989.
1986
Warriors of the airborne assault brigade stationed in Gardez.
February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
April 4-20 - Operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the Mujahideen. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's troops to break through the "security zone" around Herat.
May 4 - at the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, who had previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, was elected to the post of General Secretary instead of B. Karmal. The plenary session proclaimed an orientation towards solving the problems of Afghanistan by political methods.
June 16 - Military operation "Maneuver" - Takhar province. A long battle on Mount Yafsadzh of the 783rd ORB of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division - Jarav gorge, in which 18 scouts were killed and 22 were wounded. This was the second tragedy of the Kunduz Intelligence Battalion.
July 28 - M. Gorbachev publicly announced the imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan of six regiments of the 40th Army (about 7000 people). The withdrawal date will be postponed later. There is a debate in Moscow about whether to withdraw the troops completely.
August - Massoud defeats the government forces base in Farhar, Takhar province.
August 18-26 - Military operation "Trap" under the command of General of the Army V. I. Varennikov. The assault of the fortified area "Kokari-Sharshari" in the province of Herat.
Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from 173oSpN 22obrSpN captures the first batch of three Stinger MANPADS in the Kandahar region.
October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
November 13 - at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev noted: “We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years. If we do not change approaches, we will fight another 20-30 years. ” The Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Akhromeev, said: “There is not a single military task that would be set, but not solved, but there is no result.<…> We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but we cannot establish power in the occupied territory. We lost the fight for the Afghan people. ” At the same meeting, the task was set to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
December - the extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.
1987
Mi-8MT in the sky and on the earth (1987).
January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.
February - Operation "Blow" in the province of Kunduz.
February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar Province.
March 8 - Mujahideen bombardment of the city of Panj of the Tajik SSR.
March - Operation Thunderstorm in the province of Ghazni.
March 29, 1986 - during the fighting of the 15th brigade, when the Jalalabad battalion, with the support of the Assadabad battalion, defeated the large Mujahideen base in Karera.
- Operation "Circle" in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.
April 9 - Mujahideen attack on the Soviet border post. When repulsing the attack, 2 Soviet soldiers were killed, 20 Mujahideen were killed.
April 12 - The defeat of the Milov rebel base in Nangarhar province.
May - Operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.
- Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.
Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the state border.
November 23 - the beginning of the operation Highway to release the city of Host.
1988
The Soviet group of Special Forces is preparing for the mission, in Afghanistan, 1988.
January 7-8 - the battle at an altitude of 3234.
April 14 - Through the UN mediation in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the DRA. The guarantors of the agreements were the USSR and the USA. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, should have stopped supporting the Mujahideen.
June 24 - Opposition troops captured the center of Wardak province - the city of Maidanshehr. In September 1988, Soviet troops near Maydanshehr carried out an operation to destroy the base area of \u200b\u200bHurkabul.
August 10 - Mujahideen took Kunduz
1989
January 23-26 - Operation Typhoon, Kunduz Province. The last military operation of the SA in Afghanistan.
February 4 - the last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited military contingent, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who, according to the official version, was the last to cross the border river Amu Darya (Termez). He stated: "Not a single Soviet soldier was left behind me." This statement was untrue, since in Afghanistan there remained both Soviet troops captured by the mujahideen and border guard units that covered the withdrawal of troops and returned to the USSR only in the afternoon of February 15. The frontier troops of the KGB of the USSR carried out tasks to protect the Soviet-Afghan border by separate units in Afghanistan until April 1989.

results
Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book "Limited Contingent" expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:
Quote from the article
I am deeply convinced that there is no reason to argue that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country unhindered, carried out — unlike the Americans in Vietnam — their tasks, and organizedly returned to their homeland. If we consider the armed forces of the opposition as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, the difference between us is that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the Dushmans only what they could.
The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the domestic political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent outside aggression. These tasks by the personnel of the 40th Army were fully completed.
For the limited contingent, no one ever set the task of winning a military victory in Afghanistan. All military operations that the 40th Army had to carry out from 1980 until almost the last days of our stay in the country were either proactive or retaliatory. Together with government forces, we conducted military operations only to exclude attacks on our garrisons, airfields, convoys and communications that were used to transport goods.
Quote from the article
Indeed, before the start of the withdrawal of OKSVA in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never been able to carry out a single large operation and could not occupy a single large city. At the same time, Gromov’s opinion that the 40th Army was not tasked with military victory is not consistent with the estimates of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who was the deputy chief of operations of the 40th Army headquarters in 1985-1987, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued unchanged goals - suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition formations was only growing from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence) Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, a former deputy. The head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the leadership of Afghanistan actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000 military units (army, police, state security).
Badge "Warrior-Internationalist of the USSR"
After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries announced a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.
Humanitarian impact
The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the flow of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a considerable percentage of which remains there to this day. A 1985 photo of Sharbat Ghula on the cover of National Geographic magazine called “Afghan Girl” has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the problem of refugees around the world.
The exacerbation of the warring parties reached extreme limits. It is known that Mujahideen tortured prisoners, among which is widely known such as the “red tulip”. The weapon was used so widely that many of the villages were literally built from missiles left after the Soviet army left, residents used rockets to erect houses as ceiling ceilings, window and door beams, however, the US administration’s statement on the use of the 40th the army of chemical weapons, voiced in March 1982, were never documented.
Loss of parties
The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard Professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of the war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more were in the ranks of refugees, many of whom left the country” . Apparently, the separation of the victims into soldiers of the government army, mujahideen and civilians does not seem to exist.

After the war in the USSR, figures of the dead Soviet soldiers were published by year
1979 year
86 people
1980 year
1484 people
1981 year
1298 people
1982 year
1948 people
1983 year
1446 people
1984 year
2343 people
1985 year
1868 people
1986 year
1333 people
1987 year
1215 people
1988 year
759 people
1989 year
53 people
Total - 13 833 people. These data first appeared in the newspaper Pravda in August 1989. Subsequently, the final figure increased slightly, presumably due to those who died from the consequences of injuries and illnesses after being dismissed from the armed forces. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (those killed, those who died from wounds, illnesses and incidents, disappeared) were estimated as follows:
Soviet Army - 14,427
KGB - 576
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28
Total - 15 031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand patients.
According to the testimony of Vladimir Sidelnikov, professor of the St. Petersburg Military Medical Academy, the military personnel who died from wounds and diseases in hospitals in the USSR are not included in the final figures.
In a study of the Afghan war conducted by officers of the General Staff under the leadership of prof. Valentina Runova, provides an estimate of 26,000 deaths, including those killed in action, those who died from wounds and diseases, and those who died as a result of accidents. The following breakdown by year is provided:

In 1973, the Daud (Saur) revolution took place, overthrowing the monarchy in Afghanistan. The first president of Afghanistan was Muhammad Daud Khan (cousin of the ousted king), who relied on the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan - the PDPA. This party was formed in 1965 and adhered to a pro-communist orientation. In 1967, in view of tactical differences, two wings took shape in it: the “Halk” (“People”) headed by N. M. Taraki and the “Parchan” (“Banner”) headed by B. Karmal, who received their names by the same name fractional newspapers.

However, the new government did not solve the pressing socio-economic, political and national problems in the country. Moreover, Daud tried to actually return to monarchical forms of government. Trade unions were banned in the country, the activities of political parties, and repression fell on the PDPA. Under these conditions, the two PDPA factions united in 1977, enlisted the support of the army, and overthrew the Daud regime on April 27, 1978. The leadership of the country was taken over by the Revolutionary Council, chaired by Nur Mohammed Taraki, and Babrak Karmal became his deputy. In December 1978, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation was signed. The implementation of radical social reforms focused on the experience of building socialism in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union began. This caused strong resistance within the country and especially from the Muslim clergy: for 16 million Afghans there were 40 thousand mosques and 250 thousand mullahs. Active assistance to the opponents of the new government began to provide Pakistan, in whose territory there were about 2 million Afghan refugees. Some of them began to join the armed opposition, which was trained by Pakistani officers and instructors from various Western countries. Already in June 1978, the "National Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan" was formed. Major riots were organized in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Khost. In the spring of 1979, an attempted major invasion was launched from 1 territory of Pakistan, and in June-August armed demonstrations were suppressed in Kabul itself. These difficulties were exacerbated by the newly erupted struggle within the PDPA - between the Khalk and Parchan groups. In fact, a civil war began, during which in September 1979 the head of the PDPA and the state of Taraki was physically eliminated. The Prime Minister usurped all power, he was also Minister of Defense and Internal Affairs X. Amin, who launched a campaign of terror and repression in the country and tried to use the comprehensive assistance of the USSR to strengthen his personal power.

In this situation, on December 12, 1979, in the office of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev, in secret from the Supreme Council of the USSR, the Central Committee of the CPSU and even the Politburo, a political decision was made to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. One of the formal grounds was the "List of requests of the Afghan leadership for the introduction of various contingents of Soviet troops in the DRA in 1979," bearing the heading "Particularly Important Document" and prepared for the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, in which the requests of the Afghan leadership were reproduced in chronological order on the provision of Soviet military assistance: “April 14, 1979 - send 15–20 Soviet helicopters with crews to the DRA; June 16 - send Soviet crews to the DRA for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to guard the government, the Bagram and Shindand airfields; July 11 - to introduce several Soviet special groups of up to a battalion each to Kabul; July 19 - introduce up to two divisions in Afghanistan; July 20 - to introduce an airborne division into Kabul; July 21 - send 8-10 MI-24 helicopters with Soviet crews to the DRA; July 24 - introduce three army units into Kabul; August 12 - the speedy introduction of Soviet units, as well as three Soviet special forces, is necessary; August 21 - send 1.5–2 thousand Soviet paratroopers to Kabul, replace Afghan anti-aircraft systems with Soviet calculations; August 25 - send Soviet troops to Kabul; October 2, November 17 and 20 - send a special battalion for the personal protection of Amin; December 2 - to introduce a reinforced regiment to the province of Badakhshan; December 4 - introduce Soviet police units into the northern regions of Afghanistan; December 12 - deploy Soviet garrisons in northern Afghanistan and take protection of the DRA road. ” (Lyakhovsky A.A., Zabrodin V.M. Secrets of the Afghan war. M., 1991. P. 49-50.)

The leadership of the General Staff of the USSR opposed the deployment of troops, but his opinion was not taken into account. There are no documents in the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense in which the task was set to prepare the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. All orders were given only verbally by the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, on the basis of which about 30 different directives were made and one hundred formations, units and institutions were deployed. Over 50,000 officers, sergeants, and soldiers were called up for recruitment. (Lyakhovsky A.A., Zabrodin V.M. Decree. Op. P. 213.)

On December 24, 1979, at a meeting of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership announced the decision to send troops to Afghanistan "in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people." On the same day, a directive was sent to send troops, in which the participation of Soviet military units in hostilities was not provided, but it was assumed that the troops would become garrisons and take into custody important facilities. However, this step did not normalize the situation in Afghanistan, the civil war was tightened and expanded, and the Soviet military contingent was involved in the escalation of hostilities. Intensified international tension and military-political rivalry between the USSR and the USA.

The Afghan war lasted from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, that is 2,238 days. On December 25, 1979, at 7 a.m. in the area of \u200b\u200bTermez, two pontoon-bridge regiments began to build a pontoon bridge. At 15.00 the Soviet troops began to enter Afghanistan in accordance with the order of the USSR Minister of Defense. The scouts were the first to cross, and then, under the leadership of General K. Kuzmin, the 108th motorized rifle division. At the same time, military transport aviation began to airborne the main forces of the airborne division and a separate paratrooper regiment to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. Until the last minute, the paratroopers were not initiated into the plans of senior management. For the transfer of personnel, it took forty-seven hours, during which 343 flights were completed. 7,700 paratroopers and 894 units of military equipment were delivered to Kabul and Bagram. On December 27, the 103rd Airborne Division took control of the building of the Central Committee of the PDPA, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Communications and other important facilities of the Afghan capital. By the morning of December 28, units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division concentrated north-east of Kabul.

At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on December 27, measures were considered to propagandize the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and the transfer of power to B. Karmal. By this decision, the truth about the Afghan war was hidden for a long time from the Soviet people.

The military operation to introduce Soviet troops into Afghanistan can be divided into two stages: 1) December 27–28, 2) December 29–31, 1979. At the first stage, on December 27, the Dar-ul-Aman palace, Kabul radio and other important objects were stormed. X. Amin during the assault on the palace was mortally wounded by a grenade, however, according to the official version, "a revolutionary court sentenced the traitor Hafizullah Amin to death." (Guy D., Snegirev V. Invasion. // Banner. 1991, No. 3, P.196.) On December 28, the situation in Kabul was completely controlled by the Soviet troops.

The second stage was to cross the state border and march along the Termez-Kabul-Ghazni and Kushka-Herat-Kandahar routes and cover the most important administrative centers of the country with a ring. Performing this task, the first motorized rifle division (12 thousand people) moved in the direction of Kushka - Kandahar, and other forces through Termez, Salang Pass - to Bagram and Kabul. Part of the Soviet troops from Kabul went to Gardes.

Until January 1, 1980, 50 thousand troops were introduced, including two airborne and two motorized rifle divisions. In January 1980, two more motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan, and the total number of Soviet troops reached 80 thousand. During the first half of 1980, the Soviet military contingent continued to strengthen, especially due to four regiments of combat aircraft, three helicopter and various separate brigades and regiments.

The Soviet troops performed the following tasks: guarded the Kushka-Herat-Shindad-Hirshet-Kandahar automobile roads; Termez - Kabul; Kabul - Jalalabad; Kunduz - Fayzabad; guarded the objects of economic cooperation: the Shiteran-Dzharkuduk gas field, power plants in Surubi, Naglez, Kabul; guarded and ensured the functioning of the airfields of Kunduz, Fayzabad, Bagram, Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and others; helped strengthen government in 21 provinces; carried convoys of cargo; together with the Afghan units fought against opposition groups; fought against caravans delivering weapons and ammunition from Pakistan and Iran; solved other tasks at the request of the DRA leadership. Over time, the Soviet military contingent was increasingly drawn into large-scale military operations.

The Afghan opposition actively used the mistakes of the new government, led by Karmal, who was in a hurry to carry out agrarian reform, took an erroneous position with respect to worshipers, forced the introduction of the law on women's equal rights, including the opening of a school for girls, etc. There were numerous social pillars of the opposition. refugees, of which Dushmans were formed with the help of American military instructors in Pakistan. These units received most of the weapons from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, including the M-66 ground-to-air missiles, the Red Eye miniature missiles, mortars, flamethrowers, bazookas, as well as chemical weapons and even nervous paralytic substance 517 CC.

Since the winter of 1980/81, the opposition has intensified sabotage and terrorist activities. Instead of large groups of 500-1000 people, small groups of 30-50 people and even smaller groups consisting of 2-3 terrorists began to operate. The objects of sabotage were industrial enterprises, transport, irrigation and energy facilities. In the course of these actions of the opposition, the Soviet military contingent began to suffer noticeable losses, which, above all, was used to carry out tasks to protect state and other facilities of the DRA. If in 1979 the personnel losses amounted to 86 people, then in 1980 - 1484, in 1981 - 1298, in 1982 - 1948, in 1983 - 1446, in 1984 2343, in 1985 - 1868, in 1986 year - 1333, in 1987 - 1215, 1988 - 759, in 1989 - 53 people. (Lyakhovsky A. A. The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan. M., 1995, appendix No. 14.)

The gratuitous losses of the personnel of the Soviet troops as a whole for the entire period of the Afghan war amounted to 13 310 people killed, 35 478 - wounded and 311 missing. Annually, the war cost the Soviet people 5 billion rubles. (Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan dated May 10, 1988. Quoted from: A. Lyakhovsky. Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan. M., 1995, Appendix No. 8.) In addition, 585 employees of the KGB of the USSR and 28 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs died in Afghanistan USSR and 180 military advisers, translators and other specialists. (Ibid., Appendix No. 14.)

Almost immediately after the introduction of Soviet troops, attempts were made to politically resolve the "Afghan problem." However, only in 1986 did the leadership of the DRA put forward a national reconciliation policy program. The restructuring that began in the USSR and the new political thinking of the Soviet leadership, headed by M. S. Gorbachev in the field of foreign policy, had a direct influence on this new course. The policy of national reconciliation included: negotiations with the armed opposition; creating conditions for the return of all refugees to their homeland; political and military amnesty for all Afghans who stopped fighting against the existing government, and even the formation of a coalition government. As a result of this new policy, new forces came to the leadership of the PDPA, and M. Najibullah became the General Secretary of the Central Committee in May 1986. On November 30, 1987, in accordance with the new constitution of Afghanistan, at a meeting of representatives of all walks of life, Najibullah was elected president of the country.

After that, the DRA government allowed all refugees to return home without hindrance, guaranteed the rights and freedoms to all DRA citizens who ceased armed struggle, and by October 1989 had signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities with 2/3 of all field commanders of the Afghan opposition.

In late 1988 - early 1989, meetings were held between representatives of the USSR and the Afghan opposition, as well as with representatives of the Pakistani and Iranian leaders and former king of Afghanistan M. Zahir Shah on ending the war, restoring peace in the country and forming a coalition government. As part of these negotiations, the USSR confirmed that it would fulfill the obligations fully undertaken in Geneva on April 14, 1988 for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. By February 15, 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed, which was monitored by UN observers.

After World War II, Afghanistan, which had the status of a neutral state, was actually in the sphere of Soviet influence. Cooperation with the USSR was very close. A large number of Soviet specialists were constantly present in the country, and many Afghans studied at Soviet universities.

In 1973, a monarchy was overthrown in Afghanistan. As a result of the coup, the brother of the last king, Zakir Shah, Mohammed Daud, came to power and established a presidential dictatorship. The regime change did not affect relations with the USSR.

But the overthrow and assassination of Daoud during the coup on April 27-28, 1978, by military units loyal to the pro-communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), became a prologue to the long-term bloody war that continues to this day in Afghanistan. The Soviet side did not directly participate in the coup, but the military advisers in the country knew about its preparation, but did not receive an order to warn Daud. On the contrary, representatives of the KGB made it clear to the coup leaders that, if successful, recognition and help are guaranteed.

PDPA was a small party of the intelligentsia. In addition, it split into two warring factions: the “Hulk” (“People”) and “Parcham” (“Banner”). The president of the Hulk, the president of Hyp, Mohammed Taraki, began the intensive transformation of the country. Islam ceased to be a state religion, women were allowed to remove the veil and allowed to education. A campaign to eradicate illiteracy, agrarian reform, the beginning of collectivization was proclaimed.

All this caused discontent of the Muslim clergy and nobility. Afghan society, with the exception of a thin layer of citizens, remained essentially feudal and was not ready for radical transformations. Among the main population, the Pashtuns, the tribal structure was still preserved, and the tribal leaders were especially influential. Islam was declared a religion that reflected only the interests of the "exploiting classes", and terror was launched against the clergy. The Pashtun tribes, which they tried to disarm (traditionally, all Pashtuns carried weapons), did not get any better, and the tribal elite was deprived of power and even destroyed. The peasants refused to provide land allotments, because they did not have the means to process them, and the state was not able to provide these funds.

Already in the summer of 1978, the supporters of Islamic fundamentalism, who had fought against Daoud, began to provide armed resistance to the new government. They were joined by militias of the Pashtun tribes. By that time, Taraki’s relations with the Parchamists had worsened, many of which were executed.

On December 5, 1978, a Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation was concluded, providing for mutual assistance between the parties in repelling an external threat. Gradually, the administration of Taraki, despite the terror, was increasingly losing control of the country. In neighboring Pakistan, there were about 2 million Afghan refugees. In connection with the failures, the president’s relations with the second person in the Hulk faction, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, who enjoyed influence in the army, sharply worsened. Amin was a more determined leader and tried to strengthen the weakening power by searching for allies among various social and ethnic groups (both Amin and Taraki were Pashtuns). But Moscow decided to bet on Taraki and advised him to eliminate his opponent.

The Kremlin hoped to find a foothold in Afghanistan for a throw to the Indian Ocean. The neighboring tribes of Pashtuns and Balochis lived in neighboring Pakistan, and the PDPA leaders made territorial claims on their neighbor, hoping with the support of the USSR to occupy most of Pakistani territory.

General D.A. Volkogonov recalled that on September 8, 1978, in the presidential palace, Taraki’s guards tried to kill Amin, but only his bodyguard Amin survived, raised the faithful parts of the Kabul garrison and removed Taraki. Soon the hapless president was strangled. Amin intensified the terror, but did not reach the goal. They decided to remove him.

Both Taraki and Amin repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send troops to Afghanistan. It was about small units designed, in particular, to protect the Afghan leaders and help conduct operations against Mujahideen rebels.

The Kremlin decided otherwise. On December 12, 1979, the Politburo approved the elimination of Amin and the subsequent entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. KGB agents poured Amin's poison into food. An unsuspecting Soviet doctor pulled the dictator out of the world. Then the KGB special group Alpha went into action. Her fighters, along with special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate, unhindered arrived in the Afghan capital, supposedly to guard Amin, and on the night of December 27, 1979 stormed the presidential palace on the outskirts of Kabul, destroying Amin with his family, close friends and several dozen guards. TASS later announced that the "healthy forces of the Afghan revolution" had killed the dictator.

The next morning, Soviet troops began to arrive in Kabul. Their arrival was justified by external aggression against Afghanistan, expressed in support by Pakistan, Iran, China and the United States of the Afghan rebels, and urgent requests from the "legitimate Afghan authorities." There was a problem with legality. After all, before the Soviet invasion, Amin was the "legitimate authority", posthumously declared a CIA agent. It turned out that he himself had invited his death, and besides, he was "not quite legal," since he had to be eliminated and urgently replaced by the leader of the Parcham faction, Babrak Karmal, who had returned to the train of Soviet troops.

Soviet propaganda was not able to clearly explain to the world community who exactly invited our "limited contingent", the number of which at times reached 120 thousand people. But in the USSR, rumors circulated that Soviet soldiers were only a few hours ahead of the American landing, which was supposed to land in Kabul (although there were no troops or US bases a thousand miles from Afghanistan) in connection with the introduction of units of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan in Moscow a joke was born. "What should now be called the Tatar-Mongol yoke? - The introduction of a limited contingent of Tatar-Mongol troops in Russia to protect against the Lithuanian threat."

A limited contingent could not change the situation in the country, although by the beginning of 1980 there were 50 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers in the country, and in the second half of the year the contingent reached its maximum strength. Most of the population perceived Karmal as a puppet sitting on Soviet bayonets. The Afghan government army, melting from desertion, kept only the capital and provincial centers with Soviet support. The rebels controlled the countryside, mountainous and inaccessible. Mujahideen received help from the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan, and it was almost impossible to block the Afghan-Pakistani border, which was a conditional line on rough terrain with many mountain trails. Escaping the war, over 4 million refugees left in Pakistan and Iran Raids of the Soviet troops against partisans, like as a rule, Mujahideen did not succeed in dissolving in the mountains. The Soviet 40th Army suffered losses. The rebels fired on Soviet transports, attacked small detachments and garrisons. Some groups, in particular the army of the Tajik field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, concentrated in the Panjshir Valley, also fought successfully against entire Soviet divisions that repeatedly tried to destroy the “Panjshir lion”.

By the mid-80s, the futility of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan became apparent. In 1985, after Gorbachev's arrival, Karmal was replaced by the former head of the security service, Dr. Najibullah, who had a reputation for being a cruel but dodgy person who represented the larger Hulk faction. He tried to find support for the regime, both among part of the Pashtun tribes, and among the peoples of the north. Here, however, he could only rely on the Uzbek division of General Rashid Dostum

The Kabul government was completely dependent on Soviet military and food aid. The United States has stepped up assistance to the rebels by starting to supply them with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Several planes and helicopters were shot down and the absolute Soviet air supremacy was called into question. It became clear that we must leave Afghanistan

On April 14, 1988 in Geneva, an agreement was reached between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA on a political settlement. It was announced that Soviet troops would leave the country. On February 15, 1989, the general contingent commander, General Boris Gromov, was the last to cross the border river Pyanj. According to official figures, the losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted to 14,433 military personnel and 20 civilians killed, 298 missing, 54 thousand wounded and 416 thousand patients. There are higher estimates of Soviet losses in 35, 50, 70 and 140 thousand dead. Afghan casualties, mainly among civilians, were significantly higher. Many villages were compared to the ground by aviation, and residents were shot as hostages for the actions of partisans. Sometimes they say about a million dead Afghans, but no one counted the exact Afghan losses

After the withdrawal of troops, the Soviet side continued to provide Najibulle with massive military assistance Gorbachev said: "It is important that this regime and all its cadres are not swept to the ground .. We can’t appear before the world in shorts or even without them ..." After the August the putsch and collapse of the USSR came about

In March 1992, Dostum revolted against Najibullah, who had lost Soviet support, and occupied Kabul. Former dictator took refuge in a UN mission. A war of various ethnic and political groups, previously united by the struggle against the pro-Soviet regime, began in Afghanistan. It continues to this day. In 1996, troops of the Taliban movement, led by students of madrassas and relying on the Pashtun population, occupied Kabul. Najibullah was captured at the mission premises and hanged.

At the beginning of 2000, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of the territory of Afghanistan, with the exception of the Panjshir Valley and some adjacent territories with a predominantly Tajik population. During the offensive undertaken in the fall of 2000, the Taliban established control over virtually the entire territory of the country, with the exception of several internal enclaves and a narrow border strip in some northern areas.

The introduction of units and subunits of the Soviet Army and their participation in the civil war in Afghanistan between the armed opposition and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The civil war began to unfold in Afghanistan as a result of the reforms carried out by the pro-communist government of the country that came to power after the April Revolution of 1978. On December 12, 1979, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, guided by the article on mutual obligations to ensure the territorial integrity of the friendship treaty with the DRA, decided to send troops to Afghanistan. It was assumed that the troops of the 40th Army would ensure the protection of the country's most important strategic and industrial facilities.

Photographer A. Solomonov. Soviet armored vehicles and Afghan women with children on one of the mountain roads to Jalalabad. Afghanistan. June 12, 1988. RIA Novosti

Four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, a pipeline brigade, and separate units of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR were introduced into Afghanistan along with support and service units. Soviet troops guarded roads, gas fields, power plants, ensured the functioning of airfields, wired vehicles with military and household cargo. However, the support of government forces in hostilities against armed opposition groups exacerbated the situation and led to an escalation of armed resistance to the ruling regime.

Photographer A. Solomonov. Soviet soldiers-internationalists returning to their homeland. Road through Salang Pass, Afghanistan. May 16, 1988. RIA Novosti

The actions of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan can conditionally be divided into four main stages. At the 1st stage (December 1979 - February 1980), troops were deployed, deployed along the garrisons and organized the protection of deployment points and various facilities.

Photographer A. Solomonov. Soviet soldiers conduct engineering exploration of roads. Afghanistan. 1980s RIA News

The 2nd stage (March 1980 - April 1985) was characterized by the conduct of active hostilities, including the implementation of large-scale operations using many types and branches of the armed forces together with the government forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. At the same time, work was underway to reorganize, strengthen and supply all necessary equipment for the DRA armed forces.

The operator is unknown. Afghan Mujahideen shell a tank column of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from a mountain cannon. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

At the 3rd stage (May 1985 - December 1986), there was a transition from active military operations mainly to reconnaissance and fire support of government troops. Soviet motorized rifle, airborne and tank formations acted as reserve and peculiar “backups” for the combat stability of the DRA troops. A more active role was assigned to special forces units conducting special counterinsurgency combat operations. Assistance in supplying the armed forces of the DRA and assistance to the civilian population did not stop.

Operators G. Gavrilov, S. Gusev. Cargo 200. Sealing a container with the body of a deceased Soviet soldier before sending it to their homeland. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

During the last, 4th, stage (January 1987 - February 15, 1989) a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops was carried out.

Operators V. Dobronitsky, I. Filatov. A column of Soviet armored vehicles follows through an Afghan village. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

In total, from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, as part of a limited contingent of DRA troops, 620 thousand military personnel served (in the Soviet Army - 525.2 thousand military soldiers and 62.9 thousand officers), in the KGB and USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - 95 thousand people . At the same time, 21,000 people worked as civilian employees in Afghanistan. During their stay in the DRA, the irretrievable casualties of the Soviet armed forces amounted to (together with border and internal troops) 15 051 people. Missing and captured 417 troops, of which 130 returned to their homeland.

Operator R. Romm. A column of Soviet armored vehicles. Afghanistan. 1988. RGAKFD

Sanitary losses amounted to 469 685 people, including wounded, shell-shocked, injured - 53 753 people (11.44 percent); 415 932 people (88.56 percent) were ill; Losses in armament and military equipment amounted to: aircraft - 118; helicopters - 333; tanks - 147; BMP, BMD, armored personnel carrier - 1 314; guns and mortars - 433; radio stations, command and staff vehicles - 1,138; engineering machines - 510; motor vehicles and fuel trucks - 1,369.

Operator S. Ter-Avanesov. Division of paratroopers in intelligence. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

During his stay in Afghanistan, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 86 military personnel. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals of the USSR.

Photographer A. Solomonov. A checkpoint of a limited contingent of Soviet troops on the protection of the Kabul airfield from Mujahideen attacks. Afghanistan. July 24, 1988. RIA Novosti

Operators G. Gavrilov, S. Gusev. Soviet helicopters in the air. In the foreground is the Mi-24 fire support helicopter, in the background - the Mi-6. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

Photographer A. Solomonov. Mi-24 fire support helicopters at the Kabul airfield. Afghanistan. June 16, 1988. RIA Novosti

Photographer A. Solomonov. A checkpoint of a limited contingent of Soviet troops on the protection of a mountain road. Afghanistan. May 15, 1988. RIA Novosti

Operators V. Dobronitsky, I. Filatov. Meeting before the combat mission. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

Operators V. Dobronitsky, I. Filatov. Carrying shells to the firing position. Afghanistan. 1980s RGAKFD

Photographer A. Solomonov. Gunners of the 40th Army suppress enemy firing points in the Pagman area. Suburb of Kabul. Afghanistan. September 1, 1988. RIA Novosti

Operators A. Zaitsev, S. Ulyanov. The withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. A column of Soviet armored vehicles passes over the bridge over the river. Panj. Tajikistan. 1988. RGAKFD

Operator R. Romm. Military parade of the Soviet units on the occasion of their return from Afghanistan. Afghanistan. 1988. RGAKFD

Operators E. Akkuratov, M. Levenberg, A. Lomtev, I. Filatov. The withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Commander of the 40th Army Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov with the last armored personnel carrier on the bridge over the river. Panj. Tajikistan. February 15, 1989. RGAKFD

Operators A. Zaitsev, S. Ulyanov. Soviet border guards at the border post on the border of the USSR and Afghanistan. Termez. Uzbekistan 1988. RGAKFD

Photos taken from the publication: Military Chronicle of Russia in photographs. 1850s - 2000s: Album. - M .: Golden-Bee, 2009.

Afghan war (1979-1989)

In 1973, the Daud (Saur) revolution took place, overthrowing the monarchy in Afghanistan. The first president of Afghanistan was Muhammad Daud Khan (cousin of the ousted king), who relied on the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan - the PDPA. This party was formed in 1965 and adhered to a pro-communist orientation. In 1967, in view of tactical differences, two wings took shape in it: the “Halk” (“People”) headed by N. M. Taraki and the “Parchan” (“Banner”) headed by B. Karmal, who received their names by the same name fractional newspapers.

However, the new government did not solve the pressing socio-economic, political and national problems in the country. Moreover, Daud tried to actually return to monarchical forms of government. Trade unions were banned in the country, the activities of political parties, and repression fell on the PDPA. Under these conditions, the two PDPA factions united in 1977, enlisted the support of the army, and overthrew the Daud regime on April 27, 1978. The leadership of the country was taken over by the Revolutionary Council, chaired by Nur Mohammed Taraki, and Babrak Karmal became his deputy. In December 1978, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation was signed. The implementation of radical social reforms focused on the experience of building socialism in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union began. This caused strong resistance within the country and especially from the Muslim clergy: for 16 million Afghans there were 40 thousand mosques and 250 thousand mullahs. Active assistance to the opponents of the new government began to provide Pakistan, in whose territory there were about 2 million Afghan refugees. Some of them began to join the armed opposition, which was trained by Pakistani officers and instructors from various Western countries. Already in June 1978, the "National Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan" was formed. Major riots were organized in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Khost. In the spring of 1979, an attempted major invasion was launched from 1 territory of Pakistan, and in June-August armed demonstrations were suppressed in Kabul itself. These difficulties were exacerbated by the newly erupted struggle within the PDPA - between the Khalk and Parchan groups. In fact, a civil war began, during which in September 1979 the head of the PDPA and the state of Taraki was physically eliminated. The Prime Minister usurped all power, he was also Minister of Defense and Internal Affairs X. Amin, who launched a campaign of terror and repression in the country and tried to use the comprehensive assistance of the USSR to strengthen his personal power.

In this situation, on December 12, 1979, in the office of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev, in secret from the Supreme Council of the USSR, the Central Committee of the CPSU and even the Politburo, a political decision was made to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. One of the formal grounds was the "List of requests of the Afghan leadership for the introduction of various contingents of Soviet troops in the DRA in 1979," bearing the heading "Particularly Important Document" and prepared for the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, in which the requests of the Afghan leadership were reproduced in chronological order on the provision of Soviet military assistance: “April 14, 1979 - send 15–20 Soviet helicopters with crews to the DRA; June 16 - send Soviet crews to the DRA for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to guard the government, the Bagram and Shindand airfields; July 11 - to introduce several Soviet special groups of up to a battalion each to Kabul; July 19 - introduce up to two divisions in Afghanistan; July 20 - to introduce an airborne division into Kabul; July 21 - send 8-10 MI-24 helicopters with Soviet crews to the DRA; July 24 - introduce three army units into Kabul; August 12 - the speedy introduction of Soviet units, as well as three Soviet special forces, is necessary; August 21 - send 1.5–2 thousand Soviet paratroopers to Kabul, replace Afghan anti-aircraft systems with Soviet calculations; August 25 - send Soviet troops to Kabul; October 2, November 17 and 20 - send a special battalion for the personal protection of Amin; December 2 - to introduce a reinforced regiment to the province of Badakhshan; December 4 - introduce Soviet police units into the northern regions of Afghanistan; December 12 - deploy Soviet garrisons in northern Afghanistan and take protection of the DRA road. ” (Lyakhovsky A.A., Zabrodin V.M. Secrets of the Afghan war. M., 1991. P. 49-50.)

The leadership of the General Staff of the USSR opposed the deployment of troops, but his opinion was not taken into account. There are no documents in the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense in which the task was set to prepare the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. All orders were given only verbally by the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, on the basis of which about 30 different directives were made and one hundred formations, units and institutions were deployed. Over 50,000 officers, sergeants, and soldiers were called up for recruitment. (Lyakhovsky A.A., Zabrodin V.M. Decree. Op. P. 213.)

On December 24, 1979, at a meeting of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership announced the decision to send troops to Afghanistan "in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people." On the same day, a directive was sent to send troops, in which the participation of Soviet military units in hostilities was not provided, but it was assumed that the troops would become garrisons and take into custody important facilities. However, this step did not normalize the situation in Afghanistan, the civil war was tightened and expanded, and the Soviet military contingent was involved in the escalation of hostilities. Intensified international tension and military-political rivalry between the USSR and the USA.

The Afghan war lasted from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, that is 2,238 days. On December 25, 1979, at 7 a.m. in the area of \u200b\u200bTermez, two pontoon-bridge regiments began to build a pontoon bridge. At 15.00 the Soviet troops began to enter Afghanistan in accordance with the order of the USSR Minister of Defense. The scouts were the first to cross, and then, under the leadership of General K. Kuzmin, the 108th motorized rifle division. At the same time, military transport aviation began to airborne the main forces of the airborne division and a separate paratrooper regiment to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. Until the last minute, the paratroopers were not initiated into the plans of senior management. For the transfer of personnel, it took forty-seven hours, during which 343 flights were completed. 7,700 paratroopers and 894 units of military equipment were delivered to Kabul and Bagram. On December 27, the 103rd Airborne Division took control of the building of the Central Committee of the PDPA, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Communications and other important facilities of the Afghan capital. By the morning of December 28, units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division concentrated north-east of Kabul.

At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on December 27, measures were considered to propagandize the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and the transfer of power to B. Karmal. By this decision, the truth about the Afghan war was hidden for a long time from the Soviet people.

The military operation to introduce Soviet troops into Afghanistan can be divided into two stages: 1) December 27–28, 2) December 29–31, 1979. At the first stage, on December 27, the Dar-ul-Aman palace, Kabul radio and other important objects were stormed. X. Amin during the assault on the palace was mortally wounded by a grenade, however, according to the official version, "a revolutionary court sentenced the traitor Hafizullah Amin to death." (Guy D., Snegirev V. Invasion. // Banner. 1991, No. 3, P.196.) On December 28, the situation in Kabul was completely controlled by the Soviet troops.

The second stage was to cross the state border and march along the Termez-Kabul-Ghazni and Kushka-Herat-Kandahar routes and cover the most important administrative centers of the country with a ring. Performing this task, the first motorized rifle division (12 thousand people) moved in the direction of Kushka - Kandahar, and other forces through Termez, Salang Pass - to Bagram and Kabul. Part of the Soviet troops from Kabul went to Gardes.

Until January 1, 1980, 50 thousand troops were introduced, including two airborne and two motorized rifle divisions. In January 1980, two more motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan, and the total number of Soviet troops reached 80 thousand. During the first half of 1980, the Soviet military contingent continued to strengthen, especially due to four regiments of combat aircraft, three helicopter and various separate brigades and regiments.

The Soviet troops performed the following tasks: guarded the Kushka-Herat-Shindad-Hirshet-Kandahar automobile roads; Termez - Kabul; Kabul - Jalalabad; Kunduz - Fayzabad; guarded the objects of economic cooperation: the Shiteran-Dzharkuduk gas field, power plants in Surubi, Naglez, Kabul; guarded and ensured the functioning of the airfields of Kunduz, Fayzabad, Bagram, Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and others; helped strengthen government in 21 provinces; carried convoys of cargo; together with the Afghan units fought against opposition groups; fought against caravans delivering weapons and ammunition from Pakistan and Iran; solved other tasks at the request of the DRA leadership. Over time, the Soviet military contingent was increasingly drawn into large-scale military operations.

The Afghan opposition actively used the mistakes of the new government, led by Karmal, who was in a hurry to carry out agrarian reform, took an erroneous position with respect to worshipers, forced the introduction of the law on women's equal rights, including the opening of a school for girls, etc. There were numerous social pillars of the opposition. refugees, of which Dushmans were formed with the help of American military instructors in Pakistan. These units received most of the weapons from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, including the M-66 ground-to-air missiles, the Red Eye miniature missiles, mortars, flamethrowers, bazookas, as well as chemical weapons and even nervous paralytic substance 517 CC.

Since the winter of 1980/81, the opposition has intensified sabotage and terrorist activities. Instead of large groups of 500-1000 people, small groups of 30-50 people and even smaller groups consisting of 2-3 terrorists began to operate. The objects of sabotage were industrial enterprises, transport, irrigation and energy facilities. In the course of these actions of the opposition, the Soviet military contingent began to suffer noticeable losses, which, above all, was used to carry out tasks to protect state and other facilities of the DRA. If in 1979 the personnel losses amounted to 86 people, then in 1980 - 1484, in 1981 - 1298, in 1982 - 1948, in 1983 - 1446, in 1984 2343, in 1985 - 1868, in 1986 year - 1333, in 1987 - 1215, 1988 - 759, in 1989 - 53 people. (Lyakhovsky A. A. The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan. M., 1995, appendix No. 14.)

The gratuitous losses of the personnel of the Soviet troops as a whole for the entire period of the Afghan war amounted to 13 310 people killed, 35 478 - wounded and 311 missing. Annually, the war cost the Soviet people 5 billion rubles. (Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan dated May 10, 1988. Quoted from: A. Lyakhovsky. Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan. M., 1995, Appendix No. 8.) In addition, 585 employees of the KGB of the USSR and 28 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs died in Afghanistan USSR and 180 military advisers, translators and other specialists. (Ibid., Appendix No. 14.)

Almost immediately after the introduction of Soviet troops, attempts were made to politically resolve the "Afghan problem." However, only in 1986 did the leadership of the DRA put forward a national reconciliation policy program. The restructuring that began in the USSR and the new political thinking of the Soviet leadership, headed by M. S. Gorbachev in the field of foreign policy, had a direct influence on this new course. The policy of national reconciliation included: negotiations with the armed opposition; creating conditions for the return of all refugees to their homeland; political and military amnesty for all Afghans who stopped fighting against the existing government, and even the formation of a coalition government. As a result of this new policy, new forces came to the leadership of the PDPA, and M. Najibullah became the General Secretary of the Central Committee in May 1986. On November 30, 1987, in accordance with the new constitution of Afghanistan, at a meeting of representatives of all walks of life, Najibullah was elected president of the country.

After that, the DRA government allowed all refugees to return home without hindrance, guaranteed the rights and freedoms to all DRA citizens who ceased armed struggle, and by October 1989 had signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities with 2/3 of all field commanders of the Afghan opposition.

In late 1988 - early 1989, meetings were held between representatives of the USSR and the Afghan opposition, as well as with representatives of the Pakistani and Iranian leaders and former king of Afghanistan M. Zahir Shah on ending the war, restoring peace in the country and forming a coalition government. As part of these negotiations, the USSR confirmed that it would fulfill the obligations fully undertaken in Geneva on April 14, 1988 for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. By February 15, 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed, which was monitored by UN observers.

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2. The war in Afghanistan / [N.I. Peaks and others.]. - M., 1991.

3. Gareev M. A. My last war: Afghanistan without Soviet troops. - M., 1996.

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6. Lyakhovsky AA. The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan. - M., 1995

7. Lyakhovsky A. A., Zabrodin V. M. Secrets of the Afghan war - M., 1991

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